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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) deregistrations by foreign firms
from the time the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in 2002 through 2008. We test two theories,
the bonding theory and the loss of competitiveness theory, to understand why foreign firms leave U.S.
equity markets and how deregistration affects their shareholders. Firms that deregister grow more
slowly, need less capital, and experience poor stock return performance prior to deregistration compared
to other foreign firms listed in the U.S. that do not deregister. Until the SEC adopted Exchange Act
Rule 12h-6 in 2007 the deregistration process was extremely difficult for foreign firms. Easing these
procedures led to a spike in deregistration activity in the second-half of 2007 that did not extend into
2008. We find that deregistrations are generally associated with adverse stock-price reactions, but
these reactions are much weaker in 2007 than in other years. It is unclear whether SOX affected foreign-listed
firms and deregistering firms adversely in general, but there is evidence that the smaller firms that
deregistered after the adoption of Rule 12h-6 reacted more negatively to announcements that foreign
firms would not be exempt from SOX. Overall, the evidence supports the bonding theory rather than
the loss of competitiveness theory: foreign firms list shares in the U.S. in order to raise capital at the
lowest possible cost to finance growth opportunities and, when those opportunities disappear, a listing
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1.  Introduction 
A large literature examines why foreign firms choose to list their shares on a U.S. stock exchange.
1 
Recently, there has been an increase in the number of foreign firms leaving U.S. markets, which has led to 
concern that U.S. stock exchanges have become less attractive to foreign firms, perhaps because of the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. For foreign firms to escape all the obligations they 
accept by listing on a U.S. stock exchange, they must delist from that exchange and terminate registration 
and reporting requirements with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Without deregistering, 
a foreign firm is still subject to U.S. securities laws and, until recently, deregistration was very difficult. 
On March 21, 2007, the SEC adopted a new rule (referred to as Exchange Act Rule 12h-6) that makes it 
much easier for foreign firms to deregister. Following this policy change, more exchange-listed firms 
deregistered in 2007 and 2008 than from 2002 through to the adoption of the new rule. In this paper, we 
investigate why firms deregister, how the change in rules affected firms’ deregistration decisions, and 
what the consequences are for shareholders when firms deregister. Our sample allows us to analyze 
deregistrations that take place in the years immediately after the adoption of SOX at a time when the 
process was difficult as well as those that take place more recently when firms could much more easily 
leave U.S. markets. 
Much empirical evidence affirms that, through cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange, a foreign firm 
subjects itself to U.S. laws and institutions, and that doing so has benefits. For simplicity, we call this the 
“bonding  theory”  of  cross-listings  since,  by  subjecting  themselves  to  U.S.  laws  and  institutions,  the 
controlling shareholders of foreign firms credibly bond themselves to avoid some types of actions that 
might decrease the wealth of minority shareholders.
2 However, recently, there has been a lot of concern 
that the passage of SOX, as well as other regulatory developments in the U.S., has made it more costly for 
foreign firms to have a U.S. listing. We call this view the “loss of competitiveness theory,” since it is 
                                                 
1 See Karolyi (2006) for a review of this literature. 
2 Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) are the first to postulate this argument that a U.S. listing enhances the 
protection of the firm’s investors and, consequently, reduces the agency costs of controlling shareholders. See, 
among  others,  Reese  and  Weisbach  (2002),  Doidge  (2004),  Doidge,  Karolyi,  and  Stulz  (2004),  Hail  and  Leuz 
(2009), and Lel and Miller (2008) for related evidence.   2 
based on the notion that U.S. capital markets have fallen behind other markets  in attracting foreign cross-
listings.
3 Each of these views has direct, testable implications for which types of foreign firms deregister 
from U.S. markets and for the shareholder wealth consequences of such decisions. 
With the bonding theory, a U.S. cross-listing has a cost for corporate insiders, which is that they face 
restrictions  in  consuming  private  benefits,  and  a  benefit,  which  is  that  they  can  finance  growth 
opportunities on better terms. The benefit from cross-listing depends critically on how much corporate 
insiders gain from having their firm access capital markets on better terms. Empirical evidence shows that 
cross-listing firms have better growth opportunities and that their shareholders benefit when they cross-
list (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004, 2009; and Hail and Leuz, 2009). 
Insiders at a firm with no foreseeable need for external capital gain no benefit from having their firm 
cross-listed in the U.S. unless they intend to sell their stake. By terminating registration in the U.S., 
insiders at a firm with enough cash flow to finance its growth opportunities can extract more private 
benefits from their firm. Therefore, we expect firms to terminate registration in the U.S. when doing so is 
feasible and when it benefits their insiders. New laws and regulations that make it harder for insiders to 
extract private benefits, such as the passage of SOX, would make it more likely that insiders choose 
deregistration. This is not because the U.S. has become less competitive,  but rather, because being listed 
in the U.S. becomes less attractive for insiders even though it might have become more advantageous for 
minority shareholders. Bonding is valuable for firms with good growth opportunities, so one reason that 
insiders  would  choose  to  deregister  the  firm  they  control  is  if  it  no  longer  has  valuable  growth 
opportunities.  In  the  remainder  of  the  paper,  we  call  this  specific  hypothesis  the  bonding  theory  of 
deregistrations. With this theory, firms with poor growth opportunities in relation to their cash flows are 
more likely to deregister. Shareholders of firms that deregister are expected to be hurt by deregistration, 
                                                 
3 Zingales (2007) puts forward this alternative hypothesis. Additional arguments in support of this view can be 
found in reports of the  Committee for  Capital  Market Reform (2006, 2007), a report of the U.S.  Chamber of 
Commerce (2008), and a report by McKinsey & Company (2007) commissioned by U.S. Senator Charles Schumer 
and New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg.   3 
since it increases the corporate insiders’ discretion to extract private benefits at the expense of the public 
shareholders. 
Bonding could become less valuable because of increased deadweight costs associated with a U.S. 
exchange listing and these greater deadweight costs could lead to deregistration for firms that derive a low 
benefit from bonding. The loss of competitiveness theory does not require that firms choose to cross-list 
because of a bonding benefit. All that is required for that theory to be valid is the existence of a benefit for 
all  shareholders  from  cross-listing  that  subsequently  erodes  for  some  firms  because  of  increased 
deadweight costs associated with the burdens of U.S. laws and regulations. For such firms, cross-listing 
becomes a net cost rather than a net benefit. However, it is important to emphasize that with the loss of 
competitiveness theory, all shareholders lose as a result of the loss of competitiveness and they all benefit 
from deregistration. We explicitly test the loss of competitiveness hypothesis in the context of the passage 
of SOX, but some of our results apply to more general causes of a loss of competitiveness. 
The SOX-related competitiveness explanation predicts that there are cross-listed firms for which SOX 
imposed deadweight costs big enough to make it worthwhile for them to deregister. With the loss of 
competitiveness theory, whether or not a firm deregisters depends on the size of the adverse impact of 
SOX in relation to the benefits of listing. Although we cannot observe directly the benefits of listing, we 
can investigate whether the necessary condition for the explanation based on SOX-related deadweight 
costs holds; namely, that foreign firms, in general, and deregistering firms, in particular, were adversely 
affected by SOX. We can also investigate whether the changes in regulations that made deregistration 
easier were beneficial for these firms. Presumably the market could assess whether a U.S. listing was 
valuable for a firm in the post-SOX environment. If a listing was no longer valuable for a firm, that firm 
would  want  to deregister and  therefore  would  benefit from  the  passage  of  Rule  12h-6,  which  made 
deregistration easier. If there was any residual uncertainty about the benefits of deregistration for a firm, it 
would be resolved when that firm announced its intent to deregister. With the loss of competitiveness 
theory, the market should interpret such an announcement favorably.   4 
We examine 144 firms that deregistered from a major U.S. exchange between 2002 and 2008. Of 
these firms, 73 deregister after the adoption of Rule 12h-6 in 2007 and 2008. Throughout the period, 
firms that deregister have lower growth opportunities, as measured by sales growth and Tobin’s q, than 
firms that do not deregister. We also compute a proxy for the financing deficit (see Frank and Goyal, 
2003) for the cross-listed firms that deregister as well as for those that do not. Strikingly, firms that 
deregister have a financing surplus, so that they are returning funds to capital providers, in contrast to the 
firms that do not deregister. In general, firms that deregister come from wealthier countries but are less 
likely to be from a common law country. Before the adoption of the rule, firms that deregistered were 
much smaller than those that did not; the median total assets of deregistering firms was 25% of that of the 
median firm that did not deregister. Since the adoption of Rule 12h-6, the size of deregistering firms is 
comparable to that of the firms that do not deregister. Such a result is not surprising because firms that 
deregistered before the rule had to have less than 300 registered U.S. shareholders, a criterion that favored 
small firms and firms with concentrated ownership, a key finding of the study by Marosi and Massoud’s 
(2008)  on  foreign  firm  deregistration  activity  before  and  after  the  passage  of  SOX.  An  important 
contribution of our study is that we can evaluate directly whether Rule 12h-6 made a difference in a 
firm’s decision to deregister. Indeed, we find that it did, at least on a transitory basis. We uncover a spike 
in deregistrations in 2007, but find that the number of deregistrations in 2008 is not unusual for our 
sample period. We also find evidence that firms that deregister experience poor stock return performance 
over a number of years before deregistration. Compared to other foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges, 
the  deregistering  firms  also  have  a  significantly  lower  “cross-listing  premium,”  an  excess  valuation 
measured  in  terms  of  Tobin’s  q  ratios  relative  to  peer  firms  in  the  deregistering  firms’  country  of 
domicile. 
We next examine stock-price reactions of deregistering firms around major events surrounding the 
passage of SOX. Using a common dummy variable for all SOX events, we find no clear evidence that the 
deregistering  firms  were  affected  adversely  by  SOX  compared  to  other  foreign  firms  listed  on  U.S. 
exchanges or even that foreign firms were affected at all. However, with some regressions, we find that   5 
the firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6 were adversely affected by announcements that foreign firms 
would  not  be  exempt  from  SOX.  All  of  the  SOX  evidence  is  sensitive  to  the  benchmark  used.  In 
particular, when we find evidence of adverse effects of SOX, it tends to be for an equally-weighted 
benchmark and not for a value-weighted benchmark, suggesting that the impact of SOX was larger for 
smaller foreign firms. 
If being listed in the U.S. had deadweight costs for deregistering firms, we would expect a positive 
stock-price reaction for these firms to the announcement of the adoption of Rule 12h-6, since it means 
that these firms would be better able to avoid that deadweight cost. Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2009) 
examine the stock-price reactions of all foreign-listed firms to the final announcement of the adoption of 
Rule 12h-6. They detect no stock-price reaction, on average, but do show that firms that come from 
countries with weaker governance and disclosure were adversely affected by the adoption of Rule 12h-6, 
a finding that they interpret to be supportive of the bonding theory. Like them, we examine the stock-
price  reaction  of  firms  to  the  announcement  of  the  adoption  of  Rule  12h-6.  However,  our  focus  is 
different from theirs. They investigate whether the cross-sectional variation in the stock-price reactions of 
exchange-listed firms to the announcement is supportive of the bonding hypothesis. We investigate the 
difference in the stock-price reactions to the announcement between the exchange-listed firms that do not 
use Rule 12h-6 to deregister and those that do in order to assess whether the market viewed the adoption 
of the rule to be particularly valuable for the firms that made use of it during our sample period. We find 
no evidence that the firms that deregister using Rule 12h-6 reacted any differently to the announcement of 
the rule than firms that have not deregistered. 
Finally, we examine the stock-price reactions to the deregistration announcements themselves. As in 
Marosi and Massoud (2008), who examine the stock-price reactions around deregistration announcements 
from 1990 to 2006, we find a significant negative stock-price reaction to deregistration announcements 
before the passage of Rule 12h-6. However, after the adoption of the rule, the average announcement 
abnormal return is not different from zero and, while negative on average and for the median firm, is 
significantly less so than the average announcement return before adoption of the rule. This evidence   6 
suggests that the firms that initially took advantage of Rule 12h-6 were firms that did not benefit much 
from being in the U.S. perhaps because of poor growth opportunities, deadweight costs stemming from 
some SOX-related rules, and/or that the market largely anticipated the actions of these firms. However, 
we also find that firms with better growth opportunities and larger financing deficits have significantly 
worse deregistration-related stock-price reactions. We argue that the most plausible interpretation of this 
result is that firms more likely to benefit from bonding experience more adverse stock-price reactions to 
deregistration  announcements,  as  we  would  expect  with  the  bonding  hypothesis  of  deregistrations. 
Conversely,  because  we  always  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  abnormal  returns  around  firms’ 
deregistration  announcements  are  positive,  the  evidence  is  inconsistent  the  loss  of  competitiveness 
hypothesis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the past and new 
rules governing deregistration for foreign firms listed for trading on major U.S. exchanges. We also 
survey existing empirical research on the economic consequences of deregistration and delisting decisions 
under the old rules. Section 3 introduces our sample and compares characteristics of deregistering firms 
with those of foreign listed firms that have not deregistered. The event-study analysis of the stock-price 
reactions of the deregistering firms to the passage of SOX, to the announcement of the new Rule 12h-6, 
and around their respective decisions to deregister all follow in Section 4. We then offer concluding 
remarks. 
 
2.  The Past and Present Deregistration Process for Foreign Private Issuers in the U.S. 
On March 21, 2007, the SEC unanimously adopted Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 which substantially 
eased conditions under which foreign private issuers (FPIs) can terminate the registration of a class of 
securities under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act and its resulting Section 13(a) reporting obligations, 
or terminate and not merely suspend Section 15(d) reporting obligations. The new rule took effect on June 
4, 2007. In this section, we describe (a) the pre-existing rule and empirical evidence on deregistrations by   7 
FPIs under that rule, and (b) the key elements of the new rule and some background on why it was 
adopted. 
 
a.  The Old Rule and Some Evidence 
Under the pre-existing Exchange Act Rule 12g-4, the primary determinant regarding whether a FPI 
can terminate its registration of a class of equity securities under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act is if 
the securities are held by less than 300 residents in the U.S. (or alternatively, less than 500 residents if 
assets are less than $10 million). If a firm successfully terminates its Section 12(g) registration, it must 
then consider whether it has reporting obligations under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Section 15(d) 
provides that the periodic reporting requirements of Section 13(a) are applicable to any FPI that files a 
registration statement under the Securities Act. The criteria to suspend Section 15(d) reporting obligations 
under Exchange Act Rule 12h-3 are similar to those under Rule 12g-4. The key distinction is that the 
reporting obligations are suspended, rather than terminated. If the number of U.S. holders exceeds 300 (or 
500, if assets are less than $10 million) at the end of a fiscal year, the FPI must resume its reporting 
obligations.
4 These conditions are certified by voluntarily filing with the SEC Form 15, a one-page form 
that includes information such as the class of securities being deregistered, the class of securities that still 
may require a duty to file, the filer’s address, and the number of shareholders of record in the U.S. For 
many FPIs, it was difficult, and often, impossible to deregister, even when U.S. holdings were small and 
when trading in the U.S. was low (Greene and Underhill, 2008). 
Each U.S. exchange sets its own delisting standards and these are considerably less burdensome than 
those that govern deregistration from SEC reporting obligations. Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2004) 
                                                 
4 What constitutes a FPI is governed by Exchange Act Rule 3b-4 and the relevant statutory section applies only to 
equity securities as noted. For the purpose of determining the number of U.S. resident shareholders, a FPI must use 
the method of counting provided under Rule 12g3-2(a). This method requires looking through the record ownership 
of brokers, dealers, banks, or other nominees on a worldwide basis and counting the number of separate accounts of 
customers resident in the U.S. for  which the securities are held. Under this rule, issuers are required to  make 
inquiries of all nominees, wherever located and wherever in the chain of ownership, for the purpose of assessing the 
number of U.S. resident holders. See SEC Release Number 34-55540 of the Federal Register (Volume 72, Number 
65, p. 16934, April 5, 2007).   8 
classify delisting standards into two broad categories: profit-related and reputation-related standards. The 
profit standards are put in place to eliminate those firms that are unprofitable to the exchange and they 
stipulate  minimum  criteria  based  on  market  capitalization,  price  per  share,  number  of  publicly-held 
shares, number of registered shareholders, and trading volume.
5 The reputation-related standards are set to 
maintain the exchange’s reputation as a self-regulatory organization (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2003) 
and  allow  the  exchange  to  delist  firms  that  go  bankrupt,  are  to  be  liquidated,  or  fail  to  meet  the 
exchange’s corporate governance standards. Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio discuss how foreign firms 
may be exempted from some of these reputation-related standards. 
Many FPIs trade in the U.S. on major stock exchanges in the form of an American Depositary Receipt 
(ADR). The procedure for termination of an ADR program is set forth in the deposit agreement between 
the depositary bank and the firm. It usually requires a 30-day notice period prior to termination and the 
depositary bank will continue to issue ADRs up until the termination date and keep open the ADR facility 
for a period afterwards (up to one year) for ADR holders to be able to cancel. Cash distributions are 
initiated by the depositary bank for any ADR holders who have not cancelled by that point in time. This 
ADR termination process is again much less onerous than the process associated with deregistration from 
reporting obligations to the SEC. 
There  are  several  empirical  studies  of  the  determinants  and  economic  consequences  of  foreign 
delistings from U.S. stock exchanges, fewer on those of foreign delistings from other markets and, to the 
best of our knowledge, only three on foreign deregistrations from U.S. markets. Liu (2004) looks at the 
stock-price reactions of 103 foreign firms involuntarily delisting from U.S. markets over the period 1990-
2003, while Liu and Stowe (2005) examine the effects of 54 U.S. firms voluntarily delisting from Japan 
(1982-2002). The former study shows a 4.49% decline on average, while the latter shows no reaction 
whatsoever. Witmer (2006) confirms a 6% decline for a larger sample of 116 foreign delistings from U.S. 
                                                 
5 See NYSE Listing Standards (www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/1147474807344.html) and Listing Standards and 
Fees, Nasdaq Stock Market, May 2008 (www.nasdaq.com).   9 
exchanges between 1990 and 2003, but he also shows that firms that voluntary delist and firms with 
smaller turnover in U.S. markets experience smaller negative reactions. 
Li (2007) and Smith (2008) focus their studies on the impact of the passage of SOX on the economic 
consequences of foreign delistings in U.S. markets. Specifically, Li uncovers an insignificant negative 
pre-SOX stock-price reaction around delistings (-1.58% for 15 events with three-day event windows) 
while Smith finds an insignificant, but positive reaction (7.75% for 39 events); both studies find positive 
post-SOX reactions (an insignificant 2.39% for 40 delistings for Li; 7.52% for 33 events in Smith). 
Hostak, Karaoglu, Lys, and Yang (2007) consider a post-SOX sample of 75 voluntary foreign delistings 
but, unlike the Li and Smith studies, they uncover a statistically-significant -1.10% three-day cumulative 
abnormal  return.  Part  of  the  reason  for  the  differences  in  these  results  may  stem  in  part  from  how 
researchers identify voluntary delistings in the first place and also in part from the special characteristics 
of the firms that make that choice. Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2008) identify only 48 “true” voluntary 
delistings from a total sample of 760 foreign firms delisting over the period from 1961 to 2004 and show 
that  the  firms  delisting  following  SOX  have  lower  profitability,  lower  median  assets  and  market 
capitalization,  poorer  preceding  stock-price  performance,  and  lower  analyst  coverage.  Piotroski  and 
Srinivasan  (2008),  like  Chaplinsky  and  Ramchand,  conclude  that  important  non-SOX  related  factors 
influence delisting decisions. 
Only three studies examine the determinants of and the consequences of the decision by foreign firms 
to  deregister  from  U.S.  markets.
6  These  studies  are  related  to  the  delisting  studies  described  above. 
Delisting from a U.S. exchange eliminates the obligation to meet the exchange’s listing requirements, but 
does  not  eliminate  SEC  registration  requirements.  Firms  might  delist  with  the  intent  of  ultimately 
deregistering, but delisting does not guarantee that firms will meet the criteria to deregister because they 
could still have more than 300 U.S. shareholders after delisting. At the same time, Hostak, Karaoglu, Lys, 
and Yang (2007) focus on voluntary delistings and argue that the assumption that delisting is ultimately 
                                                 
6 Two studies examine the long-term impact of SOX in terms of deregistration decisions of U.S. issuers. Leuz, 
Triantis, and Wang (2008) and Marosi and Massoud (2007) find that more issuers deregister in the post-SOX period, 
but the significantly-negative announcement abnormal returns are similar in the pre- and post-SOX periods.   10 
aimed at deregistration is reasonable. They conclude that firms with weaker corporate governance delisted 
to avoid the governance mandates of SOX rather than to avoid compliance costs associated with SOX. 
Witmer (2006) uncovers a statistically insignificant negative stock-price reaction (-0.60%) in the 
three days around announcement of Form 15 filing dates. Almost all of his deregistration events take 
place after the passage of SOX. Li (2007) and Marosi and Massoud (2006) specifically examine the 
changes in the count of deregistration events and resulting stock-price reactions before and after SOX. Li 
finds an insignificant negative reaction around pre-SOX deregistrations (-0.62%) and an insignificant 
positive reaction after SOX (+2.30%). Marosi and Massoud, however, do not find such an evolution: the 
stock-price reactions are negative both before and after SOX.
7 One possible reason for the conflicting 
findings in these studies is that they classify “voluntary” deregistrations differently and therefore identify 
different  samples  of  deregistering  firms.  To  make  it  easier  for  researchers  to  understand  better  the 
determinants of deregistration and to clarify the choices we made in constructing our sample, we furnish 
appendices that provide a list of all firms included in our sample as well as the delisting firms that we did 
not include with appropriate reasons given. 
 
b.  The New Rule 12h-6 
New  Exchange  Act  Rule  12h-6  proposes  market-based  tests  such  that  firms  can  qualify  for 
deregistration using a benchmark of less than 5% of average worldwide trading volume taking place on 
U.S. markets (measured over the preceding year). The average daily trading volume (ADTV) must be no 
greater than 5% of the worldwide ADTV for that security (with clear definitions of which securities 
qualify for calculation during the preceding 12-month period in order to qualify for a Form 15F filing 
used to notify the SEC of the decision to terminate registration). Either the standard is met at the time of 
delisting from the U.S. exchange or there is a one-year ineligibility period for the ADTV calculation after 
an exchange delisting. There are also three additional conditions: (a) FPIs must have been a reporting 
                                                 
7 We refer here to the working paper version of the paper because the published version (Marosi and Massoud, 
2008) does not contain as much information for the comparison of the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods.   11 
company for at least one year, (b) they must not have sold securities in a registered offering for at least 
one year, and (c) they must maintain a listing in a foreign jurisdiction (their primary trading market) for at 
least one year (see Federal Register, Volume 72(65), 16941-16944). Under the new rules, any FPI can 
deregister its equity securities, although some would have to delist their securities and wait for 12 months 
to meet the trading volume requirement before deregistering (Greene and Underhill, 2008).
8 
The rule was originally proposed on December 23, 2005 (Release No. 34-53020) and, following a 
comment period, was re-proposed on December 22, 2006 (Release No. 34-55540). Why did the SEC 
change the rule? The original proposal release states: 
“The  Commission  proposed  to  amend  these  rules  out  of  concern  that,  due  to  the 
increased globalization of securities markets in recent decades as well as other trends, it 
has become difficult for a foreign private issuer to exit the Exchange Act reporting system 
even when there is relatively little U.S. investor interest in its U.S.-registered securities. 
However,  because  of  the  burdens  and  uncertainties  associated  with  terminating 
registration and reporting under the Exchange Act, the current exit process may serve as 
a  disincentive  to  foreign  private  issuers  accessing  the  U.S.  public  capital  markets.” 
(Federal Register 70, 77689-77690) 
 
There was, in fact, much controversy over the effects of SEC registration and enforcement on foreign 
companies cross-listed on major U.S. stock exchanges leading up to the original rule proposal. The fact 
that  over  30  comment  letters  were  submitted  from  40  different  businesses,  financial  and  legal 
associations, foreign companies and government agencies, and advisory, accounting, and law firms bears 
this out. The burdens and uncertainties regarding terminating registration likely became an incremental 
concern in the after-math of the passage of SOX in 2002. Two letters from the European Association of 
Listed Companies (EALIC) that discussed these concerns were submitted to the SEC well before the 
original  rule  was  proposed  (February  9,  2004  and  March  18,  2005).
9  A  further  91  comments  were 
                                                 
8 It is not known how many FPIs were eligible to deregister under old rules, but it was less than 26%. The original 
rule proposal in December 2005 relaxed the deregistration criteria, but not to the extent that was eventually adopted 
with Rule 12h-6. With the rules in the original proposal, the SEC estimated that about 26% of FPIs would be eligible 
to deregister (Greene and Underhill, 2008). 
9 We did not find any evidence that the individual deregistering firms lobbied for a change in the rules before the 
SEC announcements of the rule change, although the letters from the EALIC may have represented a number of the 
Western  European  based  firms.  We  did  find  that  11  of  the  deregistering  firms  in  our  sample  commented  on, 
expressed support for, or inquired about the proposed rule change.   12 
submitted  between  January  18,  2006  and  February  23,  2007  by  various  law  and  accounting  firms, 
consultancy firms, representatives of stock exchanges, academics as well as affected foreign firms.
10 
Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2009) examine the market impact of the final adoption of Rule 12h-6 on 
foreign firms. They show that the average abnormal return over the three days surrounding the rule 
change of exchange-listed foreign firms is -0.138% and is statistically insignificantly different from zero, 
but the median abnormal return of -0.294% is significant. For over-the-counter traded Level 1 ADRs, the 
median  abnormal  return  is  -0.534%,  but  is  not  statistically  significant.  The  negative  reactions  are 
concentrated in firms from countries with weaker home-country disclosure requirements. They interpret 
their results to be supportive of the bonding theory since the rule change makes it easier for foreign firms 
to break their commitment to U.S. rules and regulations and hence reduces the value of that commitment. 
Their study does not address the questions we focus on in this study which is to understand why firms 
deregister and what the consequences are of deregistration for a firm’s shareholders. 
 
3.  Which Firms Deregister? 
In this section, we first describe our sample of foreign firms that deregistered from U.S. markets and 
then compare the characteristics of these firms with those of firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges that did 
not  deregister.  We  first  evaluate  financial  and  operating  characteristics.  Next,  we  compare  the  risk-
adjusted  returns  performance  of  a  portfolio  of  the  foreign  firms  that  deregistered  with  those  of  a 
benchmark portfolio of firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister over the period from 
2001 to 2008. Finally, we provide some evidence on the post-deregistration experience of deregistering 
firms. 
                                                 
10 A summary of the principal comments regarding the original rule and the re-proposed rule amendments is found 
in Section I.B and I.C of the Release Number 34-55540 of the Federal Register (Volume 72, Number 65, pp. 16935-
36, April 5, 2007).   13 
a.  The Sample of Deregistering Firms 
In this paper, we want to understand why foreign firms leave major U.S. exchanges and what the 
consequences are for their shareholders. Therefore, we consider only firms that, prior to deregistration, 
had their common stock listed on a U.S. exchange (directly or more generally in the form of an ADR). 
Our sample of deregistrations does not include firms that deregister bonds previously trading in the U.S. 
By restricting our sample of deregistrations to firms listed on a major U.S. exchange, we make sure that 
SOX applies to the firms included in our sample.
  Further, it is important for our study that a firm delists 
and  deregisters  voluntarily.  In  other  words,  it  makes  the  choice  of  delisting  as  a  step  toward 
deregistration.  This  restriction  excludes,  for  instance,  firms  that  delist  because  they  are  acquired  or 
because  they  no  longer  meet  the  listing  criteria  of  the  exchange  on  which  they  are  listed.  Neither 
motivations for deregistration discussed in the introduction would apply to the firms that we exclude. 
Identifying which delistings and deregistrations prior to Rule 12h-6 are voluntary is challenging, as 
evidenced  by  the  disparity  in  sample  sizes  in  prior  studies.
11  To  construct  the  sample  of  firms  that 
deregister  before  Rule  12h-6,  we  start  from  the  list  of  firms  cross-listed  on  a  U.S.  exchange  that 
voluntarily delist between January 2002 and March 2007 (we exclude firms that delisted and deregistered 
prior to SOX).
12 In total we identify 88 voluntary delistings over this period. Delistings are identified 
from information provided by the Bank of New York, Citibank, and the Center for Research on Security 
Prices (CRSP). We then search for press releases in Lexis-Nexis and Factiva to determine the reason for 
delisting. In identifying firms that voluntarily delist, we take them at their word and record a delisting as 
                                                 
11 Marosi and Massoud (2008) identify 126 deregistrations between 2002 and 2006 (including 97 between 2002 and 
2005). Li (2007) includes only 55 deregistrations from 2002 – 2005, after excluding firms that also delist in the 
home country, become private, are acquired, have stock prices less than one unit of home currency, go bankrupt or 
are liquidated within a year of the deregistration date. Hostak, Karaoglu, Lys, and Yang (2007) study 75 voluntary 
delistings (excluding Canadian firms) from U.S. exchanges between 2002 and 2006. Although delisting does not 
necessarily imply deregistration, the number of voluntary delistings should represent an upper bound on the number 
of voluntary deregistrations. 
12 Although SOX was signed into law on July 30, 2002, we include 10 voluntary delistings (seven are included in 
the final sample) between April and June of 2002. On January 17, 2002, SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt proposed to 
create a public accounting oversight board. On February 14 the “Oxley” bill was introduced to the House Committee 
on Financial Services. The committee approved the bill on April 22 and the House passed it on April 24, 2002 
(Litvak, 2007).   14 
voluntary if a firm states that it is voluntary.
13 From the initial list of 88 voluntary delistings, we exclude 
17 firms that could potentially be included in a study of voluntary deregistrations. We exclude four firms 
that delisted in 2001 or earlier, but deregistered after SOX (two of these firms actually deregistered in 
January 2002 while the other two deregistered in 2003 and 2005). For these firms, the process of leaving 
the U.S. began with the delisting that occurred prior to SOX. Five firms that delisted between 2003 and 
2005, but then deregistered under Rule 12h-6 after March 2007 are also removed from the sample. We 
further exclude two firms that deregistered more than two years after delisting. In our empirical work, we 
require  firms  to  have  data  in  Datastream  and  Worldscope  and  we  exclude  one  firm  that  is  not  in 
Worldscope. Finally, we exclude five firms that voluntarily delisted between 2002 and 2006 for which we 
could not verify deregistration via a Form 15 filing with the SEC. Our final sample has 71 firms that 
deregistered before the adoption of Rule 12h-6 over the period from 2002 through March 2007. 
For the sample of firms that deregister under Rule 12h-6, we start with the list of 200 firms filing SEC 
Form 15F certification of FPI termination of registration between March 21, 2007 and December 30, 
2008. These filings are available from the SEC website for that period. Not all of these firms qualify for 
our analysis for a variety of reasons. First, we exclude 35 “involuntary” deregistration events due to 
mergers, acquisitions, and successor registrations. In 25 of the cases, a registered firm was acquired and 
the registered firms’ shares were deregistered after the acquisition. In the other 10 cases, an unregistered 
foreign company acquired a registered company and sought deregistration under the “expanded scope” 
condition of Rule 12h-6 related to successor issues (see Federal Register, Volume 72(65), p. 16945). We 
search for mergers, consolidations, exchanges of securities, acquisitions of assets or other control-related 
events to identify possible “involuntary” filings. Second, not all firms delisted voluntarily. Six firms were 
delisted by a U.S. exchange for violating listing standards. These firms moved to the OTC market and 
subsequently deregistered. Third, we exclude five firms that delisted prior to Rule 12h-6, but deregistered 
                                                 
13 Classifying voluntary and involuntary delistings is often difficult. Some delisting firms are often close to financial 
distress so that what appears to be a firm’s choice could, in fact, simply be a pre-emptive action for an inevitable 
involuntary delisting by the exchange. We identify 17 cases in which the delisting is announced as voluntary but 
coincides  with  financial  difficulties,  cost-cutting  or  restructuring  programs,  or  regulatory  issues  such  as  SEC 
investigations. For robustness, we verify that our results hold if we exclude these firms from the sample.   15 
after Rule 12h-6 (one firm delisted in 2003, three in 2004, and one more in 2005). These firms initiated 
the process of exiting U.S. markets under the old rules, but actually exited under the new Rule 12h-6. 
Fourth, the new rule permits FPIs to terminate reporting obligations associated with debt securities. We 
identify 27 debt deregistrations, all of which we exclude. Fifth, two firms are excluded because they are 
not in Worldscope or Datastream. Sixth, 29 firms deregistered equity securities, but the firms were never 
listed on a U.S. exchange.
14 Seventh, 16 firms that previously filed Form 15 under the previous Rules 
12g-4 and 12h-3 are excluded. The new Rule 12h-6 establishes conditions under which a previous Form 
15 filer, who could have applied for suspension of reporting obligations, can now terminate reporting 
obligations and would thus necessitate filing of Form 15F. Fifteen of these firms are included in the pre-
Rule 12h-6 sample (one firm is excluded from that sample because it delisted more than two years before 
deregistration). Finally, seven other firms are excluded for various reasons. Our final sample includes 73 
firms that deregistered under Rule 12h-6. Appendix A lists the firms in each sample, their deregistration 
form types, filing dates, announcement of filing dates, country of domicile, and home trading market. The 
firms  excluded  based  on  the  screens  above,  including  the  reasons  for  their  exclusion,  are  listed  in 
Appendix B. 
Prior  to  Rule  12h-6,  most  of  the  deregistering  foreign  firms  in  Appendix  A  are  from  Europe, 
including 15 (21% of the sample) from the U.K., 5 (7%) from Germany, and 5 (7%) from Sweden. From 
2002 through 2006, U.K firms comprise, on average, 9% of all U.S. exchange-listed firms, while German 
and Swedish firms each comprise 3% or fewer of the total. The largest non-European contingent of 
deregistering firms is from Canada (8 firms, 11%). Canadian firms represent the largest contingent of 
foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges from 2002 to 2006 (27% of the total). Except for eight firms from 
Mexico,  few  firms  from  emerging  markets  deregistered.  Following  Rule  12h-6,  the  majority  of 
deregistering firms are also from Europe, including 13 from the U.K. (18%), 12 from France (16%), and 
                                                 
14 In 1999, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) announced that the SEC approved the NASD’s 
proposed OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB) Eligibility Rule that requires only companies that file periodic reports to 
the SEC to trade on the OTCBB. The SEC required all foreign securities on the OTCBB to be fully registered, but 
only after 1999 and following a phase-in period.   16 
seven each from Germany and Netherlands (10%). Outside Europe, five firms from Australia and five 
firms from Canada deregistered (7% each). 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of our sample of deregistering firms from 2002 through 2008. In each 
of the first four years of our sample, the number of deregistrations is less than 15. In 2006, the number of 
increases to 23, and there is a huge jump in 2007, when the count reaches 57 (2 under the old rules and 55 
under new Rule 12h-6). In 2008, the number of deregistrations drops sharply to 18, a count that is similar 
to that prior to the rule change. The pattern of deregistration activity around the adoption of Rule 12h-6 
suggests that firms that wanted to deregister could not do so because the procedure was too restrictive 
before the adoption of the rule, but that the number of such firms was limited. This view is reinforced by 
considering  deregistration  events  by  month  in  2007.  By  historical  standards,  there  is  a  flood  of 
deregistrations in the first month (June 2007) that the rule becomes effective. In that month, 29 firms 
deregistered,  or  52.72%  of  the  firms  that  deregistered  under  the  new  rule  in  2007.  The  drop  in 
deregistrations in 2008 also suggests that the number of firms that wanted to leave was limited. If firms 
wanted to deregister in 2007, but could not meet the 5% trading volume requirement, they could delist in 
2007, meet the trading volume requirement by 2008 and then deregister. 
 
b.  Comparisons of Firm Attributes 
We obtain a variety of firm-level financial and operating variables on the deregistering firms and on 
all other firms cross-listed in the U.S. To identify the cross-listed firms, we use information from a variety 
of sources, including the ADR divisions of the Mellon Bank of New York, Citibank, J.P. Morgan, the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ, OTCBB, end-of-year editions of the National Quotation 
Bureau’s Pink Sheets, CRSP, firms’ annual reports, SEC Form 20-F filings, and Lexis-Nexis and Factiva 
searches.  Information  from  the  various  datasets  is  manually  cross-checked  and  verified.  The  data 
provided by Citibank and CRSP allows us to keep track of both active and inactive issues for U.S. 
listings, which mitigates concerns about survivorship bias. We classify firms by listing type, including 
those on the major exchanges (via Level 2 non-capital-raising or Level 3 capital-raising ADR programs,   17 
direct listings, or New York Registered Shares) as well as listings by means of a Rule 144a private 
placement, and over-the-counter (OTC) issues by means of the OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB), or the 
Pink Sheets (usually via Level 1 ADRs). 
We begin by comparing the deregistering firms to a benchmark sample of foreign firms with listings 
on the major U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. For our comparisons, we evaluate deregistering firms 
relative to benchmark firms in the year before deregistration. There are between 447 and 651 benchmark 
firms  in  a  given  year,  depending  on  the  availability  of  the  firm  attribute.  Our  data  source  for  firm 
characteristics is Thomson Financial’s Worldscope database. Worldscope covers companies in more than 
50 developed and emerging markets, representing more than 96 percent of the market value of the world’s 
publicly  traded  companies.  We  include  firms  with  total  assets  of  at  least  $10  million  that  are  not 
domiciled in tax havens (e.g., Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands), but we also assess the sensitivity 
of our analysis to employing higher thresholds of $100 million in total assets and to excluding financial 
firms. 
The firm-level variables are defined as follows. Total assets are in U.S. dollars, converted from local 
currencies at fiscal year-end exchange rates and leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets. 
Ownership  measures  the  fraction  of  shares  outstanding  held  by  corporate  insiders  as  computed  by 
Worldscope.
15 It includes, but is not restricted to, shares held by officers, directors and their immediate 
families,  those  held  in  trust,  those  held  by  other  corporations,  those  held  by  pension  plans,  and  by 
individuals  who  hold  5%  or  more  of  the  outstanding  shares.  We  use  three  proxies  for  growth 
opportunities: sales growth, Tobin’s q, and global industry q, which is the median Tobin’s q ratio of the 
global industry group to which the firm belongs. Sales growth is measured as a two-year geometric 
average of annual inflation-adjusted growth in sales. We adjust sales growth for inflation using the change 
in the consumer price index for the country, as reported by the International Monetary Fund. Following 
the literature, we compute Tobin’s q as follows. For the numerator, we take the book value of total assets, 
                                                 
15  Dahlquist,  Pinkowitz,  Stulz,  and  Williamson  (2003)  discuss  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  Worldscope’s 
ownership data.   18 
subtract the book value of equity, and add the market value of equity. For the denominator, we use the 
book value of total assets. We follow Frank and Goyal (2003) and compute a firm’s financing deficit as 
the sum of cash dividends, investments and net changes in working capital less internal cash flows, scaled 
by total assets.
16 We use return on assets (ROA) as a measure of accounting performance. Sales growth, 
Tobin’s q, the financing deficit, and ROA are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles to reduce the 
potential impact of outliers. 
We also use as country variables legal origin (e.g., Common law) from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), a legal index that multiplies the anti-director rights variable from Djankov, 
La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Shleifer  (2008)  by  the rule  of law index from  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998),
17 stock market capitalization divided by GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product) and (log of) Gross National Product (GNP) per capita. The latter two variables are from the 
World Bank WDI database. 
Table 1 compares characteristics of deregistering firms and foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges. 
We provide tests of differences in means with two-sided t-statistics and of medians with Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests. Whether deregistering before Rule 12h-6 or after, the deregistering firms have lower sales 
growth and a lower Tobin’s q. Deregistering firms also have a financing surplus – a negative financing 
deficit  –  in  contrast  to  benchmark  firms.  This  means  that  deregistering  firms  are  returning  funds  to 
investors rather than raising external capital. Firms that return funds to investors are generally firms with 
poor  growth  opportunities  since  they  cannot  justify  raising  external  capital  to  finance  growth 
opportunities.  Further,  deregistering  firms  are  less  likely  to  come  from  common  law  countries  than 
                                                 
16 We match the relevant Worldscope data items, subject to availability, for cash dividends (WS 04551), investments 
(including  capital  expenditures,  WS  04601  plus  additions  to  other  assets,  assets  from  acquisitions,  changes  in 
investments, other uses for investing, less disposals of fixed assets), net changes in working capital (increase in cash 
and short term investments, WS 04851, less funds from operating activities, WS 04831, less increase in short term 
borrowings, WS 04821), less internal cash flow (which includes net income, WS 04001, depreciation, deferred 
taxes, extraordinary items, other cash flows, effects of exchange rate on cash and other sources of financing ). On 
average,  we  successfully  match  60  percent  of  the  sample  of  exchange-listed  firm-year  observations,  including 
deregistering firms, from 2001 through 2007. 
17 We obtain values for the rule of law measure for China, Hungary, Poland, and Russia from Pistor, Raiser, and 
Gelfer (2000).   19 
benchmark firms. Deregistering firms come, on average, from countries with higher GNP per capita than 
benchmark firms but lower stock market capitalization to GDP. 
Firms that deregister under Rule 12h-6 differ in important ways from firms that deregistered before. 
Not surprisingly given the nature of the change in rules, firms that deregister under the new rule are larger 
than the firms that deregistered before (median $6.5 billion in total assets versus $393 million) and have 
less concentrated ownership (21% of shares outstanding versus 31%). In fact, firms that deregister under 
Rule 12h-6 are significantly larger than benchmark firms (by medians, at least) while firms that deregister 
before are significantly smaller. Firms that deregister before the rule have significantly lower ROA than 
benchmark firms as well as firms that deregister after. The ROA of firms that deregister under Rule 12h-6 
is not significantly different from that of the benchmark firms. However, firms that deregister under the 
new rule have significantly higher leverage than benchmark firms (28% total debt to assets versus 18%) 
and firms that deregister before. This higher leverage could be the outcome of poorer performance. 
We  perform  several  robustness  checks.  We  exclude  financial  firms  from  the  deregistering  and 
benchmark  set  of  firms  and  require  minimum  total  assets  to  exceed  $100  million.  Inferences  are 
unchanged for the firms that deregister under Rule 12h-6. However, the result for sales growth holds only 
for medians for the firms that deregister before the new rule. 
In Table 2, we estimate a multi-period logit model from 2002 to 2008 to compare the characteristics 
of deregistering firms with those of foreign firms listed on major U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. 
The dependent variable is set to a value of one in the year of deregistration; a value of zero corresponds to 
a firm that does not deregister in a given year. After firms deregister, they are removed from the dataset.
18 
All  firm  characteristics  are  lagged  by  year  so  that we  use  data  from  2001  to  2007.  The  coefficient 
standard  errors  are  adjusted  for  clustering  on  firms  –  they  are  computed  assuming  observations  are 
                                                 
18 Shumway (2001) shows that a multi-period logit model is equivalent to a discrete-time hazard model because the 
likelihood functions of the two models are identical. For our purposes, the advantage of the logit model is that it 
estimates a constant in the regression, whereas, the constant is subsumed into the baseline hazard in a Cox model. 
Without a constant in the model we cannot estimate a dummy variable that equals one for firms that deregistered 
after Rule 12h-6. 
   20 
independent across firms, but not within firms. The sample for Model 1 includes deregistrations before 
Rule 12h-6 as well as deregistrations under Rule 12h-6. The coefficients on Tobin’s q, the financing 
deficit, and Log(Assets), are negative and statistically significant while the coefficient on Log(GNP) is 
positive and significant. In Model 2, we add a dummy variable to Model 1 that takes value one for the 
period for which deregistration was possible under Rule 12h-6. All the coefficients that are significant in 
Model  1  are  significant  in  Model  2,  but  the  coefficient  on  Rule  12h-6  is  positive  and  significant, 
indicating  that,  even  after  controlling  for  given  firm  and  country  characteristics,  Rule  12h-6  made 
deregistration more likely. Economically, the impact of the rule change is large: the marginal effect 
associated with this Rule 12h-6 coefficient is 3.46 percent (with all other control variables evaluated at 
their unconditional means). An important concern is that the size and significance of this coefficient may 
be driven by the spike in deregistrations in 2007. Model 3 is estimated only for the period before Rule 
12h-6. The coefficients on Tobin’s q and the financing deficit are negative and significant at the 10% 
level, while the coefficient on total assets is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the insider 
ownership variable is now positive and significant. Finally, Model 4 is estimated over the period for 
which Rule 12h-6 is in effect. Tobin’s q is significant at the 10% level in Model 4, as is sales growth. The 
financing deficit continues to be negative and significant. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on Log(Assets) 
is significantly lower in Model 3 than in Model 4 and the coefficient on insider ownership is significantly 
higher. Higher leverage makes deregistration more likely in Model 4 and the coefficient on Leverage is 
significantly higher than in Model 3. Finally, the coefficient on Legal is negative and significant at the 
10% level in Model 4 and it is significantly lower than the coefficient in Model 3. A Chi-squared test 
shows  that  the  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  in  Models  3  and  4  are  equal  can  be  rejected  at  any 
reasonable level of significance. We estimate the models of Table 2 restricting the sample to non-financial 
firms with assets in excess of $100 million and the results (not reported) are similar.
19 
                                                 
19 One possible explanation for the increase in deregistration activity that is not directly related to the bonding 
hypothesis or to the loss of competitiveness hypothesis is that these firms invested in improving their transparency 
and governance systems so that a U.S. exchange listing became less valuable for their minority shareholders. To 
explore  this  possibility,  we  obtained  2006  data  on  the  corporate  governance  scores  from  FTSE  Institutional   21 
Figure 2 shows that these differences in firm characteristics exist for a number of years. In Panel a, 
we show the evolution of sales growth for the benchmark exchange-listed firms and for the Rule 12h-6 
deregistering firms from 2000 to 2007. Between 2001 and 2003, the average sales growth rates of the 
deregistering and benchmark firms both declined substantially. However, the growth opportunities of the 
deregistering firms did not recover after 2003, while those of the benchmark exchange-listed firms did. It 
seems unlikely that the passage of SOX had influence over the evolution of sales growth of some foreign 
cross-listed firms during this period. 
To compare differences in the “cross-listing premium” for the Rule 12h-6 deregistering firms and the 
benchmark exchange-listed firms, we estimate regressions similar to those in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 
(2004, 2009) except that we estimate the premium separately for each group of firms.
20 Panel b of Figure 
2 shows the evolution of the premium. In 2000, both groups have large premiums and the difference 
between them is not statistically significant. In 2001 and 2002, the premium decreases for both groups of 
firms and the difference between them remains insignificant. In 2003, the premium for the benchmark 
exchange-listed firms increases relative to the deregistering firms and that difference remains through 
2006. The premium is significantly greater for the benchmark firms each year from 2003 through 2006 
with the exception of 2005 (p-values of 0.04, 0.09, 0.21, and 0.05, respectively, by year). The difference 
is not significant in 2007. The difference in the evolution of the premium after 2002 is consistent with the 
difference in the evolution of sales growth, which makes it unlikely that it was caused by SOX. Further, 
the event study evidence that follows in Section 4 shows that it is even less likely that SOX had an impact 
                                                                                                                                                             
Shareholder Services (ISS), which covers a broad range of governance attributes, mostly for firms from developed 
countries. The ISS sample includes 2,349 non-U.S. firms. We matched the ISS sample with our sample in Table 2 
for 54 of the 73 Rule 12h-6 deregistering firms and for 274 of their exchange-listed peers. Overall, the governance 
scores are lower for the deregistering firms, but  when  we re-estimate our  multi-period logits  with this smaller 
sample, we find that these scores do not furnish any additional explanatory power. 
20 The cross-listing premium is estimated from an ordinary least squares regression of Tobin’s q on dummy variables 
for whether the firm was exchange-listed at some point and deregistered in 2007 under Rule 12h-6 or not, whether it 
is a non-deregistering U.S. exchange-listed firm or not, whether it is a Rule 144a private placement or not, whether it 
is an Level 1 OTC U.S. listing or not, whether it is listed in London on AIM, as a depositary receipt, or as an 
ordinary listing, trailing two-year geometric-averaged sales growth, median Tobin’s q of the global industry group 
of the firm, and log assets. The regression includes all non-financial firms that are in the Worldscope database and 
have total assets of at least $100 million in a given year. We use this more restrictive sample here to make the results 
comparable  with  prior  research.  The  regression  is  estimated  with  country  fixed  effects  and  with  country-level 
clustering of standard errors.   22 
on the differential evolution of the cross-listing premium for deregistering firms and for the benchmark 
exchange-listed firms during this period. 
 
c.  Comparison of Portfolio Returns 
Was the stock return performance of the deregistering firms different from the performance of the 
benchmark exchange-listed firms during the period leading up to their decision to deregister? With the 
bonding theory of deregistration, we would expect that firms with poor growth opportunities in relation to 
their cash flows are more likely to deregister. Further, with that theory, firms would have listed when they 
had good growth opportunities. Consequently, we would expect their returns to underperform leading up 
to the decision to deregister. With the loss of competitiveness hypothesis, there is no reason to expect 
persistent abnormal performance in the deregistering firms, but with that hypothesis deregistering firms’ 
stock prices should react poorly to announcements related to SOX if it decreased the competitiveness of 
U.S. markets. 
We evaluate the risk-adjusted returns on a portfolio of the firms that deregistered over the period from 
2001  to  2008.  Deregistering  firms  are  included in the  portfolio starting  on January  5,  2001  and  are 
excluded from the portfolio starting one week prior to deregistration. We require that there are at least 
five firms in this portfolio. We compute U.S. dollar-denominated weekly (Friday to Friday) home-market 
returns with data from Datastream. A similar procedure is followed for a portfolio of the benchmark 
exchange-listed firms.
21 The return difference between the two portfolios is regressed on the weekly U.S. 
dollar-denominated return on the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) world market portfolio 
(excluding the U.S.) obtained from Datastream (in excess of the U.S. Treasury bill yield from CRSP), as 
                                                 
21 We exclude benchmark firms with less than 100 weekly observations over the period of analysis (2001-2008), 
those with less than $10 million in total assets, and any firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002. To eliminate 
extreme observations associated with thin trading, we require that firms’ shares trade in at least 40% of the weekly 
observations. Finally, we screen the data for errors (see Ince and Porter (2006) for a discussion of the issues). The 
portfolio consists of 600 to 700 different firms over the period of analysis.   23 
well as the size and book-to-market factors, SMB and HML, from Fama and French (1993) obtained from 
Professor Ken French’s website at Dartmouth University.
22 
Table 3 presents the regression results. We estimate the regressions using equally-weighted portfolio 
returns  (Models  1  to  3)  and  value-weighted  portfolio  returns  (Models  4  to  6).  The  intercept  of  the 
regressions captures the difference in risk-adjusted return performance between deregistering firms and 
benchmark firms. Models 1 and 4 include all deregistering firms and are estimated from January 5, 2001 
– June 27, 2008 (the last date for which there are at least five firms in the deregistering firm portfolio). 
We include a dummy variable in these regressions for firms that deregister under Rule 12h-6. Models 2 
and  5  include  only  firms  that  deregistered  prior  to  Rule  12h-6  (estimated  over  January  5,  2001  – 
December 15, 2006) and Models 3 and 6 include only firms that deregistered under Rule 12h-6. We find 
that  deregistering  firms  perform  poorly  compared  to  benchmark  firms  when  using  equally-weighted 
portfolio returns when we examine all deregistering firms as well as for firms that deregistered before and 
after Rule 12h-6. However, the result is sensitive to whether we use value-weighted portfolios or equally-
weighted portfolios for firms that deregister under Rule 12h-6. The fact that these firms underperform 
when  we  use  an  equally-weighted  portfolio  but  not  a  value-weighted  portfolio  suggests  that  the 
underperformance is greater among the smaller firms that deregister. When we restrict the sample to non-
financial firms with assets in excess of $100 million, the results reported in Table 3 are generally the 
same. 
 
d.  The Post-Deregistration Experience of Deregistering Firms 
Data is not yet available to investigate post-deregistration characteristics by firms that deregistered 
under  Rule  12h-6.  However,  we  can  use  data  for  firms  that  deregistered  before  the  rule  change  to 
investigate how the characteristics of these firms changed from the year before deregistration to the year 
after. We focus on the median of a given characteristic for deregistering firms and compare it to the 
                                                 
22 SMB is a market-neutral hedge portfolio of U.S. stocks which takes long positions in small capitalization stocks 
and short positions in large capitalization stocks. HML is a market-neutral hedge portfolio of U.S. stocks which 
takes long positions in high book-to-market ratio stocks and short positions in low book-to-market ratio stocks.   24 
median of the exchange-listed firms. We require firms to have data in Worldscope for the year before and 
the year after deregistration. This requirement leaves us with a sample of 57 deregistering firms. For sales 
growth, we use one-year trailing sales growth rather than two-year trailing sales growth as before. We 
find that asset size and ROA falls compared to benchmark firms. We also find that ownership becomes 
more concentrated. Such greater concentration might enable insiders to extract more private benefits from 
control. 
 
4.  SOX, Loss of Market Competitiveness, and Deregistering Foreign Firms 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is perhaps the most controversial reform of American corporate law 
in the last 70 years. It establishes rules affecting not only every public company registered in the U.S., but 
also many legal, auditing, and financial services firms and government agencies dealing with public 
companies. A number of public policy organizations and others link the passage of SOX to a loss of U.S. 
market competitiveness (Committee for Capital Market Reform, 2006, 2007; McKinsey and Company, 
2007; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2007; and, Zingales, 2007). 
Several empirical studies evaluate the effects of SOX on U.S. firms by examining stock returns, 
changes in accounting and audit costs, and going-private decisions, but with mixed results (see, among 
others, Rezaee and Jain, 2006; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Engel, Hayes, and, Wang, 2007; Li, 
Pincus, and Rezo, 2007; Zhang, 2007). Leuz (2007) argues that the greatest challenge to these studies is 
the absence of a natural control group of comparable, but unaffected, U.S. firms against which to judge 
the impact of SOX. As a result, other researchers have sought answers by focusing on the impact of SOX 
on  various  decisions  and  market  outcomes  for  foreign  firms  listed  on  U.S.  exchanges  relative  to 
equivalent domestic peers unaffected by the legislation (Duarte, Kong, Young, and Siegel, 2007; Hostak, 
Karaoglu, Lys, and Yang, 2007; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2009; Marosi and Massoud, 2008; and, 
Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008). Studies by Berger, Li, and Wong (2005), Li (2007), Litvak (2007), and 
Smith (2008) examine the abnormal stock-price reactions of foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges to the 
announcements of the passage of key provisions of the Act and other important related events. Litvak   25 
concludes that there is a significant negative reaction to SOX events for exchange-listed foreign firms 
when measured relative to foreign firms not listed in the U.S. and to foreign firms listed in the U.S. via 
Rule 144a and Level 1 ADRs as benchmarks; Berger, Li, and Wong look at similar SOX-related events 
but use a value-weighted portfolio of U.S. stocks as a benchmark and find a positive reaction for foreign 
exchange-listed stocks; and, both Li and Smith uncover significant negative abnormal returns for foreign-
listed firms when measured relative to home-market index returns as benchmarks. 
In this section, we compare the stock-price reactions to SOX of cross-listed firms on U.S. exchanges, 
in general, and specifically of firms that deregister. The loss of competitiveness theory relies on the view 
that SOX affected firms adversely. As a result of this adverse effect, the value of a U.S. listing became 
negative for some firms and these firms became eager to leave the U.S. markets. They did so when they 
could, which for some firms meant that they had to wait for the adoption of Rule 12h-6 to leave. The loss 
of competitiveness theory implies that the shareholders of firms that deregistered would have suffered 
greater wealth losses from the passage of SOX than those of firms that did not deregister. To test this 
hypothesis,  we  necessarily  have  to  investigate  whether  firms  with  U.S.  exchange  listings  and 
deregistering  firms  had  adverse  stock-price  reactions  on  SOX  announcement  days  and,  even  more 
importantly, whether those reactions were larger for deregistering firms. 
We can also test a corollary of the loss of competitiveness theory. The SEC eventually adopted the 
change  in  rules  on  terminating  registration  after  significant  lobbying  pressure  from  a  number  of 
organizations  and  firms  that  grew  in  the  wake  of  SOX.  The  Commission  first  issued  proposed 
amendments  in  December  2005;  following  an  open  comment  period,  the  revised  rule  was  issued  in 
December 2006 and adopted in March 2007. When it became clear that qualifying firms could deregister 
under the new, less-burdensome rules, their shareholders should have benefited. The SEC announcements 
should be associated with positive abnormal returns for the firms that would eventually deregister relative 
to other firms with U.S. exchange listings. Further, if there was any uncertainty about whether a specific 
firm  could  deregister,  a  firm’s  deregistration  announcement  following  the  rule’s  adoption  by  the 
Commission  should  have  been  associated  with  a  positive  abnormal  stock-price  reaction.  Finally,  we   26 
should expect that the positive abnormal stock-price reactions should be larger for those firms that were 
most adversely impacted by the passage of SOX. We investigate each of these three additional hypotheses 
in this section. 
 
a.  Stock-Price Reactions of Foreign Firms to SOX 
To investigate whether deregistering firms were more adversely affected by SOX than firms that did 
not deregister, we obtain daily U.S. dollar-denominated home-market returns from 2001 to 2003 from 
Datastream  on  each  of  the  deregistering  firms  listed  in  Appendix  A  and  on  the  benchmark  set  of 
exchange-listed foreign firms that did not deregister, as used in the analysis of the previous section. We 
also obtain daily U.S. dollar-denominated returns from Datastream on stocks of foreign companies listed 
in the U.S. markets via Level 1 OTC ADRs or Rule 144a private placements.
23 
SOX-related event dates are extracted from Table 1 of Litvak (2007).
24 She identifies 14 different 
events that range from the earliest proposal by the SEC to create a public company accounting oversight 
board (eventually, the PCAOB) in January 17, 2002, to deliberations and passage of the bill in the House 
of Representatives (April 22 to 24, 2002) and in the Senate Banking Committee and Senate (June 12 and 
July 16, 2002, respectively), to the President’s signing of the bill (July 30, 2002). In the context of the 
loss of competitiveness hypothesis, some events are interpreted positively for U.S. listed foreign firms, 
such as SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt’s suggestion at a Financial Times conference of an exemption for 
foreign companies (October 8, 2002), though most are perceived as negative developments. 
To assess the effect of these SOX-related events, we construct equally- and value-weighted portfolios 
of all exchange-listed firms, of the deregistering firms and subsets thereof, and of a benchmark set of 
exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (seven different portfolios, in total). This approach allows us 
                                                 
23 Firms with less than 260 daily observations over the period from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2003 are 
excluded, as well as those with less than $10 million in total assets and those that delisted prior to July 8, 2002. As 
noted earlier, we also apply screens for thin trading and data errors. 
24 The 14 SOX event dates in Litvak differ from the 17 events in Zhang (2007), though 9 events are common. 
Zhang’s dates were constructed for U.S. firms and do not include three events specific to foreign private issuers. The 
time-line of events in Smith (2008) is adopted from Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007), which, in turn, is broadly 
similar to those in Li, Pincus, and Rego (2003) and Rezaee and Jain (2003).   27 
to estimate the overall impact of SOX for each group of firms, while accounting for cross-correlations in 
firms’  stock  returns,  a  critical  issue  when  analyzing  the  impact  of  common  events,  like  regulatory 
changes, across firms (see Schwert, 1981, Schipper and Thompson, 1983; and, Binder, 1985). To estimate 
the abnormal stock-price reactions for the SOX events, we specify and estimate by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) the following regression over the period from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2003: 
  Rp,t = α + β × Rb,t + δ´Event_Dummy + εt, 
where Rp is the daily return for the portfolio of interest, Rb is the return on a benchmark portfolio, and 
Event_Dummy is a vector that contains 14 dummy variables associated with each of the key SOX dates. 
We estimate this regression for the seven portfolios using equally-weighted portfolio returns (Models 
1 to 7) and another seven portfolios using value-weighted portfolio returns (Models 8 to 14). In each 
regression, the benchmark portfolio consists of Level 1 OTC and Rule 144a firms. These firms constitute 
an appropriate benchmark since they are foreign firms that are participating in the international capital 
markets, but are not registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act of 1934 and are not 
subject to the provisions of SOX. To define the event dummies, we set each dummy variable equal to one 
for the day of the event, the day before, and the day after, and to zero on all other days. We include one 
day before and after the event because the stocks in each portfolio come from different countries where 
the home markets of these stocks often have different opening hours than the U.S. markets. As a result, 
news in the U.S. on date t could be impounded in the stock price in its home country on date t-1 or on day 
t+1.
25 All the models with long only positions have an R-square in excess of 50% and the coefficient of 
the portfolios on the benchmark portfolio is close to one. The coefficients on the constant term and on the 
event dummies that are reported in Table 4 are multiplied by 100. 
In Models 1 and 8, Rp is the return on a portfolio that includes all foreign firms cross-listed on U.S. 
exchanges. Two SOX dates have a significant abnormal return for Models 1 and 8. For the equally-
                                                 
25 Although we use the same event dates as Litvak (2007), we define the event dummies differently to account for 
differences in the time zones of the firms’ home markets. For example, for the early SEC announcement on January 
17, we set it to one on January 16, 17, and 18 whereas Litvak sets it to one only on January 18 (Litvak, 2007, Table 
1). When we re-define the dummies this way, however, none of our main conclusions are affected.   28 
weighted portfolios in Model 1, there is a negative significant abnormal return on the date of the first 
announcement by the Senate Committee (Event 4, 0.52% with a t-statistic of 1.70) but there is a positive 
and significant abnormal return on the day that the President signed the bill into law (Event 11, 0.65% 
with a t-statistic of 2.11). The latter result is not consistent with the loss of competitiveness hypothesis, 
but  the  former  is.  For  the  value-weighted  portfolios  in  Model  8  there  are  positive  and  significant 
coefficients around the day that the Senate Banking Committee met and approved the bill (Event 5, 0.61% 
with a t-statistic of 2.05) and around the day that Chairman Pitt suggested an exemption (Event 13, 0.40% 
with a t-statistic of 1.73). The latter result is consistent with the loss of competitiveness hypothesis, but 
the former is not. Overall, there is no pervasive evidence that the SOX event days had an adverse impact 
on foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges. 
Models 2 and 9 are estimated for all deregistering firms. For both regressions, there is a significant 
negative abnormal return associated with a date when an announcement was made that foreign-listed 
firms would not be exempted from some SOX rules. For the equally-weighted portfolio, there is an 
abnormal return of -0.984% (t-statisic of 2.39) for the announcement of no exemption to SEC Rule 302 
(Event 12) and an abnormal return of 0.500% that is insignificant for the announcement of no exemptions 
to  Rules  404,  406,  and  407  (Event  14).  For  the  value-weighted  portfolio,  there  is  an  insignificant 
abnormal return of -0.343% for the former announcement and an abnormal return of -0.578% significant 
at  the  10%  level  for  the  latter  announcement.  Though  these  results  are  consistent  with  the  loss  of 
competitiveness hypothesis, in Model 9 there is a large positive and significant abnormal return on the 
day of the Senate Committee decision (Event 5) that is hard to interpret in the context of that hypothesis. 
We also estimate these regressions separately for the firms that deregister before Rule 12h-6 (Models 3 
and 10) and those that deregister under that rule (Models 4 and 11). The evidence is mixed. For the 
equally-weighted  portfolios,  the  firms  that  use  Rule  12h-6  appear  to  be  sensitive  to  announcements 
concerning  potential  exemptions  from  SOX.  However,  this  is  not  the  case  for  the  value-weighted 
portfolios. The evidence for equally-weighted returns is weaker for the firms that deregister before Rule 
12h-6.   29 
The last three sets of regressions for both the equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolio returns 
are long positions in the deregistering firms and short positions in portfolios of exchange-listed firms that 
did not deregister (in Models 5 and 12, the deregistering firm portfolio includes all deregistering firms; in 
6 and 13, it includes firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6; and, in 7 and 14, it includes firms that 
deregistered under Rule 12h-6). The results show again some evidence that deregistering firms experience 
worse returns on dates of announcements that foreign firms would not be exempted from SOX rules for 
the equally-weighted portfolios. For the value-weighted portfolios, the results are weaker. Moreover, the 
deregistering firms do better on two other dates when they would be predicted to have worse returns 
(Events 5 and 9) and they do worse on two dates when they would be predicted to do better (Events 10 
and 13). On balance, it seems that the smaller firms that deregister under Rule 12h-6, but not the larger 
firms, were affected more strongly by announcements concerning the applicability of SOX to cross-listed 
firms than other cross-listed firms. 
In Panel b, we aggregate all the SOX dates into one SOX dummy variable. We use a value of -1 for 
the days that should have positive abnormal returns according to the loss of competitiveness hypothesis. 
Again, we find different results for the equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. For the equally-
weighted portfolios, the deregistering firms were affected adversely by the SOX events and the non-
deregistering firms were not. There is no evidence that SOX had any effect for any group of firms when 
we use value-weighted portfolio returns. In Panel c, we redefine our composite SOX dummy variable for 
a subset of SOX events; namely those identified by Litvak (2007) in her Table 1 as important. These dates 
are highlighted in bold in Panel a of Table 4. The evidence is mixed. There is some evidence that the SOX 
announcements had a negative impact when we consider the returns of equally-weighted portfolios and 
there is evidence that the impact is worse for firms that deregister under Rule 12h-6 than it is for firms   30 
that do not deregister. However, there is no evidence for the value-weighted portfolios that these SOX 
announcements had a negative impact on the stock prices of foreign firms.
26  
What we learn from these different specifications is that inferences about whether or not SOX had an 
adverse impact on foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges or on deregistering firms are model sensitive. 
For example, Litvak (2007) concludes that SOX had a negative impact on the stock prices of foreign 
firms with U.S. exchange listings. However, her approach gives equal weight to each observation or uses 
an equally-weighted benchmark.
27 The results we report in Table 4 with equally-weighted portfolios are 
consistent with the results reported in Litvak (2007), but the results with value-weighted portfolios show 
that there is little evidence to support the conclusion that SOX had a negative impact on stock prices. 
Since an equally-weighted portfolio gives more weight to small firms than a value-weighted portfolio, it 
seems reasonable to say that the results are consistent with the view that the aggregate wealth losses 
associated with SOX were not economically significant but that there is some evidence that the smallest 
firms were affected adversely. When we compare firms that deregistered with those that did not, there is 
evidence that firms that deregistered under Rule 12h-6 were affected more adversely by SOX when we 
use  equally-weighted  portfolios,  but  none  when  we  use  value-weighted  portfolios.  Our  evidence  for 
foreign firms is therefore consistent with some evidence for U.S. firms showing that smaller firms were 
affected  adversely  by  SOX  but  not  the  larger  firms  (e.g.  Chhaochharia  and  Grinstein,  2007).  These 
conclusions are robust if we restrict our sample firms to non-financial firms with assets of more than $100 
million. 
                                                 
26 To understand better the role of portfolio weighting in the results, we also estimate regressions in Panel c using an 
equally-weighted portfolio as the dependent variable and a value-weighted portfolio as the benchmark portfolio. The 
results are similar to those reported in the table. 
27 The t-statistics on the SOX dummies reported in Litvak’s Table 6 are also likely overstated. The regressions are 
estimated using ordinary least squares, which is problematic when the regression uses firm-level data and event 
dates common across all firms. The standard errors do not account for the cross-correlation of the error terms across 
firms, which is likely to be substantial around the event period.   31 
b.  Stock-Price Reactions of Deregistering Firms to Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 
Did  the  firms  that  deregistered  in  2007  and  2008  under  Rule  12h-6  react  favorably  to  the 
announcements of the new rules to ease the process toward termination of registration? The loss of 
competitiveness theory would predict it would be so since the market at that time would have understood 
well the costs of the new provisions of SOX and likely knew that these firms would have a good chance 
to be eligible to exercise the option to deregister under the new rules. 
To answer this question, we use the same equally- and value-weighted portfolios of the sample of 
deregistering firms (Rule 12h-6 firms only) and benchmark portfolios of the other exchange-listed foreign 
firms and Level 1 OTC/Rule 144a private placement firms. There are three events we consider in the 
analysis: (a) December 14, 2005, which was the date of the announcement of the proposed rule,
28 (b) 
December 13, 2006, which was the date of the announcement of the re-proposed rule after the extended 
comment period,
29 and (c) March 21, 2007, when the Commission officially adopted the rule. We use the 
same methodology as the previous section considering each deregistration event date with a separate 
dummy variable and a condensed event dummy for all three events. 
Table 5 provides our estimates of the stock-price reactions to the announcements related to Rule 12h-
6. We find that no date that has a significant stock-price reaction. The result for exchange-listed firms for 
the last announcement date is not surprising in light of the work of Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2009).
30 
The result for deregistering firms is hard to reconcile with the loss of competitiveness theory since the 
market  would  presumably  have  anticipated  that  these  firms  would  benefit  from  the  announcements. 
However, the estimates are not supportive of the bonding theory either. With that theory, we would 
expect a negative announcement return for the rule change since allowing firms to renege more easily on 
the bonding provided by adherence to U.S. laws and regulations would decrease the value of a U.S. 
                                                 
28 See Release No. 34-53020 and as it applies to 17 Code of Federal Regulation Parts 200, 232, 240 and 249. 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-53020.pdf.  
29 See Release No. 34-55005 at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/34-55005.pdf. 
30 Fernandes, Lel and Miller (2009) focus on the March 27, 2007 date, but also consider several dates related the 
passage of Rule 12h-6, including the December 14, 2005 first proposal, the December 13, 2006 re-proposal of the 
rule, and a January 25, 2005 announcement that the SEC was considering a revision. They also find that the stock 
prices of firms do not appear to have reacted to these earlier announcements.   32 
listing.  At  the  same  time,  Fernandes,  Lel,  and  Miller  (2009)  find  that  the  stock-price  reactions  are 
negative and significant for firms from countries with weak governance and disclosure. They conclude 
that this result is consistent with the bonding theory. We repeated the analysis with the more restrictive 
sample that excludes financial firms are requires assets of at least $100 million and with longer event 
windows and our basic results are unchanged.
31 
 
c.  Stock-Price Reactions of Deregistering Firms to their Deregistration Announcements 
We now turn to the stock-price reactions around firms’ deregistration announcements. We estimate 
abnormal returns using three-day market model residuals. Our benchmark portfolio consists of all non-
U.S. firms with Level 1 and Rule 144a ADRs for Panel a and all non-deregistering foreign firms cross-
listed on U.S. exchanges in Panel b. We lose four firms from the sample of firms that deregistered prior to 
Rule  12h-6  because  they  do  not  have  returns  data  available  in  Datastream  around  their  respective 
deregistration announcement dates. Further, we exclude six firms that made other potentially confounding 
announcements  on  the  same  day  that  they  announced  their  deregistration  decisions.  We  compute  t-
statistics and account for cross-sectional dependence as in Brown and Warner (1985). 
The results are reported in Table 6. We first consider the sample of all deregistering firms. Regardless 
of the benchmark portfolio used, the mean abnormal return is negative (between -1.11% and -1.26%) and 
significant at least at the 5% level. All binomial tests are significant as well. When we turn to the pre-Rule 
12h-6 deregistering firms, we find larger negative abnormal returns (-1.92% to -2.15%). Finally, when we 
turn to the Rule 12h-6 deregistering firms, the average abnormal return is not significantly different from 
zero and is significantly smaller than the average abnormal return of the firms that deregistered before the 
                                                 
31 Although the results are similar when we use a longer event window, it is still possible that the market anticipated 
the rule change announcements. On February 9, 2004, the European Association for Listed Companies submitted a 
letter to the SEC complaining about the deregistration rules. On various occasions prior to the new rule proposal in 
December 2005, the SEC announced it was considering changes to the rules, but did not provide any details. For 
example, in a speech on January 25, 2005, SEC Chairman William Donaldson stated that he “expects the SEC to 
consider whether there should be a new approach to the deregistration process for foreign private issuers” and, on 
October 7, 2005, SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman stated that “I fully support the staff's initiative to take a 
fresh look at our rules in order to ease the deregistration process, so long as any new approach continues to protect 
US investors.” See “SEC set to make delisting easier for foreign firms” Reuters News (January 25, 2005) and  
“The SEC in a global marketplace: current issues” States News Service (October 7, 2005).   33 
rule. However, the binomial test is significant for the Rule 12h-6 firms. In all cases, we can reject the 
hypothesis that the average or median abnormal return is positive. Though we do not show the results in 
the table, we also evaluated the abnormal returns for each calendar year. The average abnormal return is 
negative every year, although in 2007 the average abnormal return is small in magnitude (only -0.15%). 
Strikingly, however, the average abnormal return for 2008 is -1.52% with a t-statistic of -1.11. The lack of 
precision could stem from the fact that there are only 17 observations in 2008, but, in any case, one 
should be careful in interpreting the average abnormal return for that year. Interestingly, this average 
abnormal return is more similar to the returns before Rule 12h-6 than to the average abnormal return for 
2007. 
We performed several robustness checks on these results. First, we excluded financial firms and firms 
with assets of less than $100 million. This size requirement has a minimal impact on the Rule 12h-6 
sample, but, not surprisingly, it has a bigger impact on the sample of firms that deregistered prior to that 
rule, where we lose about 30% of the firms. The results for the Rule 12h-6 firms are similar to those 
reported in the table, while those for the firms that deregistered prior to this rule are weaker. We also 
investigate the sensitivity of the results to the choice of event date. For firms that deregistered prior to the 
rule change, in 43 out of 67 cases, delisting and deregistration are announced on the same date, while for 
firms that deregistered under Rule 12h-6, the announcement date is the same for 62 out of 73 firms. 
Because  delisting  could  be  the  first  signal  that  the  firm  plans  to  deregister,  we  use  the  delisting 
announcement as the event date if it is before the deregistration announcement. The results are similar to 
those reported in the table, although the announcement returns for firms that deregistered prior to the rule 
change are smaller in magnitude (around -1.60% with t-statistics of 1.80). 
We next turn to regressions to understand the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns. These 
regressions are presented in Table 7. The format of the table is exactly the same as the format of Table 2, 
although we add two additional variables in these regressions: “U.S. trading %” which is the percentage 
of the total average daily trading volume (home market plus U.S. market) that takes place in the U.S. and 
a “SOX cost dummy” which equals one for the 28 firms that mentioned compliance costs associated with   34 
SOX as a motivation for the deregistration decision in their respective press releases. We estimate the 
regressions  using  firm  characteristics  from  the  year  before  deregistration.  We  show  results  for  two 
benchmark portfolios: the equally-weighted portfolio of Level 1 OTC/Rule 144a cross-listed firms and 
the value-weighted portfolio of exchange cross-listed firms that did not deregister. 
Model 1 includes all deregistering firms. The most reliable result we find is that firms with larger 
financing deficits have significantly larger negative share price reactions. That is, shareholders experience 
a wealth loss in firms with greater financing needs that choose to pursue deregistration from U.S. markets. 
This finding is consistent with the finding in Table 2 earlier that firms with such deficits are much less 
likely to pursue a deregistration in the first place. The finding is robust to the benchmark portfolio used in 
the specification of abnormal returns (including unreported specifications of value-weighted portfolios of 
Rule 144a/OTC benchmark firms and equally-weighted portfolios of exchange listed benchmark firms). 
Few of the other variables are reliably significant in these regressions. Part of the reason may be that the 
other proxies for growth opportunities, such as sales growth, Tobin’s q, global industry q, and ROA are 
correlated. To assess this possibility, we evaluate alternative model specifications. For example, if we 
exclude Tobin’s q, ROA, and the financing deficit variables, the negative coefficient on sales growth 
becomes significant. In Model 2, we include a dummy variable that equals one for firms that deregister 
under Rule 12h-6. This dummy variable is not significant and the other results are unchanged. 
The results differ for firms that deregister before the adoption of Rule 12h-6 (Model 3) and those that 
deregister under that rule (Model 4). We find that for firms that deregister prior to Rule 12h-6, the 
coefficient on the financing deficit remains negative and significant. For firms that deregister under Rule 
12h-6, the coefficient on the financing deficit, though still negative, is no longer significant. However, 
deregistering  firms  under  Rule  12h-6  with  higher  sales  growth  do  experience  worse  announcement 
returns, even when including the alternative proxies for growth opportunities in the specification (at least 
with  the  Rule  144a/OTC  firms  as  the  benchmark  portfolio).  In  Table  1,  we  show  that  Rule  12h-6 
deregistrants are larger in size and have smaller financing surpluses than the pre-Rule 12h-6 deregistrants,   35 
which could explain why share price reactions are more acutely sensitive to financing needs for pre-Rule 
12h-6 deregistrants and to sales growth for Rule 12h-6 deregistrants. 
Overall these results are consistent with the bonding hypothesis. With that hypothesis, bonding is 
more valuable for firms with better growth opportunities that have to be financed externally. In all of our 
regressions,  sales  growth consistently  has  a  negative  coefficient  (though  it  is  only  significant  in  the 
regressions for the Rule 12h-6 subsample in the regressions reported in the table) and we always find that 
one of the variables that proxies for growth opportunities or financing need is significantly negatively 
related  to  the  stock-price  reaction  to  the  deregistration  announcement.  However,  one  alternative 
explanation of the sales growth and financing deficit results could be that the market infers from the 
announcement that the firm’s growth opportunities are poorer than expected or their financing needs are 
more  severe.  Leuz,  Triantis,  and  Wang  (2008)  test  this  hypothesis  for  a  sample  of  U.S.  firms  that 
deregister. The problem with this explanation in our context, however, is that it requires a theory other 
than bonding to rationalize why the market would have such a reaction. Admittedly, there is a cost saving 
from delisting and deregistering, but that saving would seem small enough for the firms in our sample 
such that it is unlikely to support such a signaling outcome.  
We further investigate whether firms attribute their decision to deregister partly to SOX and U.S. 
regulatory burdens. For 28 of the 134 firms included in the event study, we find evidence of this, based on 
statements made in the press release of the deregistration announcement and set the SOX cost dummy 
equal to one for these firms. This dummy variable has a negative coefficient in seven out of eight of the 
models, but it is never statistically significant. 
The evidence in Table 7 suggests that deregistration is typically bad news for shareholders of firms 
with good growth opportunities or with financing needs. Such firms are those for which a U.S. listing 
with SEC registration is likely to be more valuable. Hence, it might not be surprising that the market 
would react poorly to the announcement that such firms chose to deregister. As we noted in Table 2, the 
firms that deregister under Rule 12h-6 are different from those that deregistered before.   36 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyze a sample of firms that chose to deregister from the SEC and leave U.S. 
equity markets over the period from 2002 through 2008. Because it was extremely difficult to deregister 
before  March  27,  2007  when  the  SEC  adopted  its  new  Exchange  Act  Rule  12h-6  to  facilitate 
deregistration, foreign firms that wished to deregister most likely did not do so because they were unable 
to  meet  the  necessary  requirements.  When  Rule  12h-6  came  into  effect,  deregistration  became 
substantially  easier  and  the  change  in  the  rules  was  followed  by  a  large  spike  in  the  number  of 
deregistrations that did not extend into the following year. We investigate why foreign firms deregister, 
how the rule change affected firms’ deregistration decisions, and what the economic consequences are of 
their decisions to deregister. 
Two theories offer predictions about the characteristics of and consequences for deregistering firms. 
The first theory follows directly from the bonding theory of cross-listing that predicts corporate insiders 
value a listing when their firm has valuable growth opportunities that they can finance on better terms by 
committing to the laws and rules that govern U.S. markets. The listing comes at a cost to insiders since it 
limits  their  ability  to  extract  private  benefits  from  their  controlling  position.  If  a  firm  is  no  longer 
expected to require outside finance because its growth opportunities have been taken advantage of or 
because they have disappeared, a listing is no longer valuable for insiders. Consequently, firms that 
deregister should be those with poor growth opportunities, have little need for external capital, and have 
performed poorly. Deregistration should be advantageous for insiders, but not for minority shareholders, 
so that it should be accompanied by a negative abnormal return. Further, this negative return should be 
worse for firms with higher growth opportunities and more need for external capital. With the bonding 
theory,  the  value  of  a  cross-listing  is  higher  for  a  firm  if  it  is  harder  for  the  firm  to  deregister. 
Consequently, the passage of new Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 should have had an adverse impact on cross-
listed firms. Like Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2009), we fail to find support for this prediction of the 
bonding theory for the overall rule change. However, they further investigate the cross-sectional reaction   37 
to the announcement and find that the firms that in theory would benefit the most from bonding reacted 
more poorly to the announcement. 
We also consider a hypothesis which we call the loss of competitiveness theory. This theory predicts 
that  firms  deregister  because  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  and  possibly  other  regulatory 
developments, reduced the net benefits of a U.S. listing  so that, for some firms, the value of a listing 
became negative. With this explanation, foreign firms should have experienced wealth losses from SOX, 
the firms that deregistered should have experienced worse wealth losses, and the introduction of the new 
deregistration rules and the deregistration announcements themselves should increase shareholder wealth. 
It is possible, however, that the deadweight regulatory costs that motivate the loss of competitiveness 
theory could have led to deregistration activity even if the bonding hypothesis is correct, in that these 
costs might have led cross-listings to stop being advantageous for some firms. 
We find no unambiguous evidence supportive of the loss of competitiveness hypothesis. The clearest 
evidence in favor of this hypothesis would be that deregistering firms benefit from deregistration and 
were adversely affected by SOX. We find no evidence that the minority shareholders of deregistering 
firms benefit from deregistration. There is some evidence that these firms were affected adversely by 
SOX when we use equally-weighted portfolios, but not when we use value-weighted portfolios and value-
weighed portfolios are arguably the correct way to measure the overall economic impact since they reflect 
the overall value change of these firms. In contrast, we find evidence that is consistent with the bonding 
hypothesis. Specifically, the deregistering firms are poor performers, have lower growth opportunities, 
and have a financing surplus, all characteristics that reduce the value of a cross-listing with the bonding 
theory. Further, we find in most tests that the market reacts negatively to the announcements of SEC 
deregistration. Finally, we show that the stock-price reactions are worse for firms with better growth 
opportunities and with greater financing deficits, which are the firms that are still likely to benefit more 
from bonding.   38 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. 
This table compares the characteristics of the 144 non-U.S. firms that deregistered from major U.S. exchanges with the characteristics of non-U.S. firms with 
cross-listings on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. There are 71 firms that deregistered between 2002 and March 2007 prior to Rule 12h-6: 9 in 2002; 14 in 
2003; 9 in 2004; 14 in 2005; 23 in 2006; and 2 in 2007. There are 73 firms that deregistered using Rule 12h-6 between March 21, 2007 and December 31 30, 
2008: 55 in 2007 and 18 in 2008. Each year there are between 447 and 651 exchange-listed firms that did not deregister between 2002 and 2008 with data on 
firm characteristics. Firm characteristics are compared in the year prior to deregistration and the data is pooled across two sub-periods, 2002-March 2007 (Panel 
a) and April 2007-2008 (Panel b). The Excess median is computed by subtracting the median value for a given characteristic for exchange-listed firms from the 
deregistering firm’s characteristic. The table reports the median of this difference. Firm-level data is from the Worldscope database. Sales growth is inflation 
adjusted two-year sales growth (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), global industry q is the median global industry q, Tobin’s q is computed as ((Total Assets – 
Book Equity) + Market Value of Equity) / Total Assets (all variables are in local currency), the financing deficit is computed as the sum of cash dividends, 
investments, change in net working capital less internal cash flow, scaled by total assets (multiplied by 10 in the table for reporting purposes), total assets are in $ 
millions, leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets, ROA is return on assets, and ownership is the data item “closely-held shares” from Worldscope. 
Common law is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s legal origin is based on common law. Legal is anti-director × rule of law, from Djankov et al. 
(2008) and La Porta et al. (1998). Log of GNP per capita ($) and stock market capitalization to GDP are from the World Bank WDI Database. *, **, and *** 
indicate that the deregistering firms’ characteristics are significantly different from the exchange-listed firms’ characteristics in a given period at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. #, ##, and ### indicate that the Excess median for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 is significantly different from the 
Excess median for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. 
  Panel a. Pre-Rule 12h-6 period (2002-March 2007)    Panel b. Rule 12h-6 period (April 2007-2008) 
  Deregistering firms    Exchange-listed firms    Deregistering firms    Exchange-listed firms 
  Mean  Median  Excess 
median    Mean  Median    Mean  Median  Excess 
median    Mean  Median 
Sales growth  0.04
*  0.02
***  -0.04    0.11  0.06    0.05
***  0.04
***  -0.05    0.13  0.09 
Tobin’s q  1.54
*  1.25  -0.10    1.74  1.35    1.69
***  1.42  -0.12    2.01  1.53 
Global industry q  1.26  1.19  0.01
#    1.26  1.19    1.40
***  1.40
*  -0.02    1.50  1.41 
Financing deficit  -0.02
**  -0.03
***  -0.06
##    0.43  0.03    -0.06
***  -0.04
**  -0.01    0.60  0.07 
Total assets  5325.65
***  393.32
***  -1062.28
###    31972.32  1455.6    26304.49
***  6556.72
***  4552.11    58480.7  2004.62 
Leverage  0.22  0.17  -0.04
###    0.23  0.21    0.27
***  0.28




###    0.01  0.04    0.05  0.06  0.01    0.03  0.05 
Ownership  0.37  0.31  0.02
##    0.33  0.28    0.23
**  0.21
**  -0.04    0.32  0.25 
Common law  0.46
*  0.00
**  -1.00    0.58  1.00    0.36
***  0.00
***  -1.00    0.57  1.00 
Legal  30.79  31.43  -0.17    31  31.6    31.84
*  35.00  3.40    29.89  31.60 
GNP / capita  10.02
***  10.17
***  0.14
#    9.65  10.03    10.46
***  10.51  0.01    9.90  10.50 
Market cap / GDP  0.91
**  0.95  -0.02    1.02  0.97    1.28
*  1.18
**  -0.16    1.42  1.34 
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Table 2. Multi-Period Logit Regressions: The Characteristics of Deregistering Firms. 
The logit models estimate the probability of deregistration in year t, given that the firm has not yet deregistered, over 
the period from 2002 to 2008. The dependent variable equals one for the 144 non-U.S. firms that deregistered from 
major U.S. exchanges in the year of deregistration (71 firms prior to Rule 12h-6 and 73 firms after Rule 12h-6). 
After firms deregister they are removed from the dataset. Model 1 includes all deregistering firms. Model 2 is the 
same as Model 1, but adds a Rule 12h-6 dummy variable that equals one for firms that deregistered under that rule. 
Model 3 is estimated over 2002-2006 and excludes firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Model 4 is estimated 
over 2007-2008 and excludes firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6. Firm-level data is from the Worldscope 
database. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth 
(winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), Tobin’s q is computed as ((Total Assets – Book Equity) + Market Value of 
Equity) / Total Assets (all variables are in local currency), global industry q is the median global industry q, the 
financing deficit is computed as the sum of cash dividends, investments, change in net working capital less internal 
cash flow, scaled by total assets, total assets are in $ thousands, leverage is defined as total debt divided by total 
assets, ROA is the return on assets, and ownership is the data item “closely-held shares” from Worldscope. Legal is 
anti-director × rule of law, from Djankov et al. (2008) and La Porta et al. (1998). Log of GNP per capita ($) and 
stock market capitalization to GDP are from the World Bank WDI Database. The t-statistics, in parentheses are 
adjusted for clustering on firms – they are computed assuming observations are independent across firms, but not 
within firms. Pseudo-R
2 is a goodness-of-fit measure based on the difference between unrestricted and restricted 
likelihood functions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. #, 
##,  and  ###  indicate  statistical  significance  for  a  chi-squared  test  that  tests  whether  the  coefficients  are  equal 
between the pre-Rule12h-6 (Model 3) and Rule 12h-6 (Model 4) periods and “Chi-squared” indicates the joint test 














         






Sales growth  -0.525  -0.590  -0.254  -1.503 
  (1.04)  (1.12)  (0.39)  (1.91)
* 






Global industry q  0.241  -0.495  0.598  -0.998 
  (0.74)  (1.22)  (1.19)  (1.59)
## 












Leverage  -0.025  0.138  -1.094  1.469 
  (0.05)  (0.24)  (1.11)  (1.77)
*, ## 
ROA  -0.433  -0.627  -1.378  1.351 
  (0.53)  (0.78)  (1.63)  (0.92) 
Ownership  0.259  0.252  1.335  -0.705 
  (0.60)  (0.56)  (2.11)
**  (1.13)
## 
Legal  -0.015  -0.005  0.021  -0.024 
  (1.30)  (0.46)  (1.07)  (1.67)
*, # 
Stock market cap / GDP  -0.247  -0.479  -0.654  -0.405 
  (1.57)  (2.17)
**  (2.40)
**  (1.26) 






Rule 12h-6 dummy    1.507     
    (6.31)
***     
Chi-squared test (p-value)      61.55 (0.00) 
         
Number of observations  3384  3384  2527  857 
Pseudo R
2  0.0931  0.1370  0.1144  0.1269 44 
 
Table 3. Return Performance of Deregistering Firms. 
This table compares the return performance of firms that deregistered with non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. The regression, 
RDereg, t – RBench, t = α + β × [RW_exUS, t – Rf,t) + γ × SMBt + δ × HMLt + εt, is estimated by OLS. RDereg is the weekly (Friday to Friday) U.S. dollar return on a 
portfolio of firms that deregistered. RBench is return on a portfolio of non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. We require that this 
portfolio have at least five firms. RW_exUS is the weekly U.S. dollar return on the world market portfolio (excluding the U.S.). SMB and HML are the size and 
book to market factors from Fama and French (1993). Firms with less than 100 weekly observations, less than $10 million in total assets, and firms that delisted 
prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. Deregistering firms are included in the portfolio starting on January 5, 2001 and are excluded from the portfolio starting one 
week prior to deregistration. Models (1) and (4) include all deregistering firms and the regression is estimated from January 5, 2001 – June 27, 2008. Models (2) 
and (5) estimate the regression for the firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (over January 5, 2001 – Dec 15, 2006). Models (3) and (6) estimate the 
regression for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6 (over January 5, 2001 – June 27, 2008). t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 





















               




**    (1.27)  (1.78)
*  (0.07) 








SMB  -0.04543  0.06284  -0.14028    0.06620  0.22073  0.03695 
  (0.85)  (0.82)  (2.57)
**    (1.43)  (2.45)
**  (0.75) 
HML  -0.02229  -0.16274  0.05459    0.22673  -0.02368  0.30749 
  (0.38)  (2.00)
**  (0.91)    (4.47)
***  (0.25)  (5.73)
*** 
Rule 12h-6 dummy  0.00261        0.00158     
  (2.04)
**        (1.42)     
               
Number of observations  391  309  391    391  309  391 
Adjusted R
2  0.0159  0.0285  0.0182    0.0561  0.0902  0.1147 
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Table 4. Stock-Price Reactions of Exchange-Listed firms and Deregistering Firms Around SOX Events. 
The regression Rp,t = α + β × Rb,t + δ´Event_Dummy + εt, is estimated from Jan 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2003. Event_Dummy is a vector that includes dummy 
variables for the SOX event dates from Litvak (2007), Table 1. Events predicted to have a negative (positive) reaction have “-” (“+”) superscripts. Events in bold 
are identified by Litvak (2007) as important SOX events. In (1) and (8) Rp is the daily U.S. dollar return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms cross-
listed on U.S. exchanges. In (2) and (9) the portfolio includes all firms that deregistered between 2002 and 2008; in (3) and (10) it includes all firms that 
deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 between 2002 and 2006; in (4) and (11) it includes all firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6 between 2007 and 2008. In (5) – 
(7) and (12) – (14) Rp is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms (all deregistering firms; deregistering firms prior to Rule 12h-6; 
deregistering  firms after  Rule12h-6) and the portfolio of exchange-listed  firms that did not deregister (denoted  “Dereg – Exch”). Rb is the return on the 
benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations, less than $10 
million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. In Panel a, coefficients are estimated for each event dummy variable. In Panels b 
and c, a single dummy variable that equals one (negative one) on predicted negative (positive) events is defined. Coefficients on the constant and the event 
dummies are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The t-
statistics for the coefficient on the benchmark portfolio are all significant at the 1% level (*’s not shown). 
  Equally-weighted portfolio returns    Value-weighted portfolio returns 
























































                               
Constant  -0.026  -0.104  -0.122  -0.091  -0.095  -0.113  -0.081    -0.053  -0.051  -0.129  -0.027  0.002  -0.075  0.027 






***    (2.79)
***  (2.37)
**  (3.02)
***  (1.25)  (0.13)  (2.15)
**  (1.21) 
1
-    Early SEC  -0.292  -0.503  -0.433  -0.559  -0.257  -0.187  -0.312    -0.093  -0.215  -0.574  -0.108  -0.139  -0.498  -0.031 
  (0.95)  (1.23)  (0.78)  (1.40)  (0.86)  (0.42)  (0.96)    (0.31)  (0.64)  (0.86)  (0.32)  (0.49)  (0.91)  (0.09) 
2
-    House Committee  -0.351  -0.830  -1.560  -0.250  -0.582  -1.312  -0.001    -0.142  -0.232  -0.639  -0.125  -0.103  -0.510  0.005 
  (1.14)  (2.02)
**  (2.80)
***  (0.63)  (1.96)
*  (2.98)
***  (0.00)    (0.48)  (0.69)  (0.96)  (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.93)  (0.02) 
3
-    Full House  -0.231  -0.344  -0.618  -0.124  -0.137  -0.411  0.083    -0.147  -0.227  -0.254  -0.224  -0.091  -0.118  -0.088 
  (0.97)  (1.08)  (1.43)  (0.40)  (0.59)  (1.21)  (0.33)    (0.64)  (0.87)  (0.49)  (0.85)  (0.42)  (0.28)  (0.33) 
4
-    Senate Committee 1
st announcement  -0.521  -0.321  -0.468  -0.202  0.243  0.096  0.362    -0.031  0.289  0.108  0.317  0.365  0.185  0.394 
  (1.70)
*  (0.78)  (0.84)  (0.51)  (0.82)  (0.22)  (1.11)    (0.11)  (0.85)  (0.16)  (0.93)  (1.29)  (0.34)  (1.15) 
5
-    Senate Committee follow up  0.382  0.519  0.205  0.771  0.166  -0.148  0.418    0.611  1.029  0.913  1.046  0.478  0.361  0.494 
  (1.25)  (1.26)  (0.37)  (1.94)
*  (0.56)  (0.34)  (1.28)    (2.05)
**  (3.04)
***  (1.37)  (3.07)
***  (1.69)
*  (0.66)  (1.45) 
6
-    WorldCom Announcement  0.135  0.260  0.274  0.251  0.152  0.166  0.143    0.435  0.181  0.477  0.087  -0.290  0.007  -0.384 
  (0.44)  (0.63)  (0.49)  (0.63)  (0.51)  (0.38)  (0.44)    (1.46)  (0.53)  (0.71)  (0.25)  (1.02)  (0.01)  (1.12) 
7
-    Sarbanes Amendment  -0.158  -0.221  -0.231  -0.213  -0.076  -0.086  -0.069    -0.125  -0.247  0.478  -0.399  -0.138  0.587  -0.290 
  (0.59)  (0.62)  (0.48)  (0.62)  (0.30)  (0.23)  (0.24)    (0.49)  (0.84)  (0.83)  (1.35)  (0.57)  (1.24)  (0.98) 46 
 
 
Table 4, continued. 
  Equally-weighted portfolio returns    Value-weighted portfolio returns 

























































                               
8
-    Dorgan Amendment  -0.281  -0.465  -0.658  -0.309  -0.222  -0.415  -0.067    -0.420  -0.334  -0.777  -0.274  0.098  -0.345  0.158 
  (0.81)  (1.00)  (1.04)  (0.69)  (0.66)  (0.83)  (0.18)    (1.24)  (0.87)  (1.03)  (0.71)  (0.31)  (0.56)  (0.41) 
9
-    Bills pass House and Senate  0.039  0.317  0.651  0.051  0.336  0.670  0.071    0.291  0.236  1.517  -0.054  -0.062  1.218  -0.352 
  (0.16)  (0.96)  (1.46)  (0.16)  (1.41)  (1.90)
*  (0.27)    (1.22)  (0.87)  (2.84)
***  (0.20)  (0.28)  (2.78)
***  (1.29) 
10
+  Conference Report  -0.013  0.503  0.247  0.711  0.626  0.370  0.834    0.136  -0.437  -0.677  -0.403  -0.650  -0.889  -0.615 
  (0.05)  (1.40)  (0.51)  (2.04)
**  (2.40)
**  (0.96)  (2.92)





-  President  0.647  0.453  0.382  0.509  -0.236  -0.307  -0.180    0.185  0.146  -0.503  0.316  -0.043  -0.693  0.126 
  (2.11)
**  (1.10)  (0.69)  (1.28)  (0.79)  (0.70)  (0.55)    (0.62)  (0.43)  (0.75)  (0.93)  (0.15)  (1.26)  (0.37) 
12
-  SEC Rule 302: no exemption  -0.223  -0.984  -0.792  -1.136  -0.923  -0.730  -1.074    -0.008  -0.343  -0.080  -0.446  -0.380  -0.117  -0.483 
  (0.73)  (2.39)




***    (0.03)  (1.01)  (0.12)  (1.30)  (1.34)  (0.21)  (1.41) 
13
+  Pitt suggests exemptions  0.309  0.481  0.303  0.628  0.209  0.031  0.356    0.400  0.022  -0.073  0.033  -0.427  -0.522  -0.417 
  (1.30)  (1.51)  (0.70)  (2.03)
**  (0.90)  (0.09)  (1.41)    (1.73)
*  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (1.95)
*  (1.23)  (1.58) 
14
-  SEC rules 404, 406, 407 no exemptions  -0.148  -0.500  -0.096  -0.828  -0.427  -0.023  -0.755    -0.415  -0.578  -1.446  -0.425  -0.183  -1.051  -0.031 
  (0.48)  (1.22)  (0.17)  (2.08)
**  (1.43)  (0.05)  (2.32)
**    (1.39)  (1.71)
*  (2.17)
**  (1.25)  (0.65)  (1.92)
*  (0.09) 
Portfolio: Level 1 & Rule 144a firms  1.101  1.263  1.353  1.193  0.196  0.287  0.127    1.159  1.069  1.509  0.945  -0.103  0.337  -0.227 
  (42.49)  (36.37)  (28.75)  (35.49)  (7.81)  (7.72)  (4.60)    (56.05)  (45.52)  (32.60)  (40.00)  (5.24)  (8.88)  (9.60) 
                               
Number of observations  782  782  782  782  782  782  782    782  782  782  782  782  782  782 
Adjusted R
2  0.7074  0.6377  0.5242  0.6264  0.0821  0.0747  0.0422    0.8059  0.7341  0.5847  0.6819  0.0381  0.1020  0.1053 47 
 
 
Table 4, continued 
  Equally-weighted portfolio returns    Value-weighted portfolio returns 
Panel b. Condensed event dummy – all 

























































                               
Constant  -0.025  -0.098  -0.122  -0.080  -0.088  -0.112  -0.070    -0.048  -0.056  -0.137  -0.032  -0.009  -0.090  0.015 






***    (2.57)
**  (2.64)
***  (3.25)
***  (1.49)  (0.51)  (2.59)
***  (0.71) 
All events dummy  -0.096  -0.249  -0.239  -0.258  -0.186  -0.175  -0.195    -0.019  0.038  0.167  0.005  0.065  0.194  0.032 




**  (1.59)  (2.37)
**    (0.25)  (0.45)  (1.00)  (0.06)  (0.92)  (1.41)  (0.38) 
Portfolio: Level 1 & Rule 144a firms  1.102  1.256  1.350  1.184  0.187  0.281  0.115    1.159  1.072  1.509  0.950  -0.099  0.338  -0.221 
  (43.42)  (36.86)  (29.28)  (35.75)  (7.57)  (7.70)  (4.23)    (56.81)  (46.15)  (32.97)  (40.63)  (5.08)  (9.00)  (9.47) 
                               
Number of observations  782  782  782  782  782  782  782    782  782  782  782  782  782  782 
Adjusted R
2  0.7070  0.6354  0.5233  0.6213  0.0727  0.0710  0.0267    0.8054  0.7318  0.5816  0.679  0.0312  0.093  0.1016 
                               
Panel c. Condensed event dummy – 
























































                               
Constant  -0.024  -0.099  -0.125  -0.080  -0.092  -0.117  -0.072    -0.046  -0.052  -0.136  -0.027  -0.007  -0.091  0.018 






***    (2.46)
**  (2.46)
**  (3.24)
***  (1.27)  (0.40)  (2.63)
***  (0.84) 
Important SOX events dummy  -0.211  -0.328  -0.242  -0.397  -0.142  -0.056  -0.211    -0.113  -0.091  0.212  -0.172  0.024  0.328  -0.056 
  (2.17)
**  (2.50)
**  (1.36)  (3.12)
***  (1.48)  (0.40)  (2.01)
**    (1.18)  (0.84)  (0.99)  (1.57)  (0.27)  (1.87)
*  (0.51) 
Portfolio: Level 1 & Rule 144a firms  1.100  1.253  1.347  1.181  0.186  0.280  0.113    1.158  1.070  1.511  0.947  -0.099  0.342  -0.223 
  (43.42)  (36.77)  (29.20)  (35.70)  (7.49)  (7.66)  (4.15)    (56.65)  (45.98)  (32.94)  (40.48)  (5.09)  (9.08)  (9.51) 
                               
Number of observations  782  782  782  782  782  782  782    782  782  782  782  782  782  782 
Adjusted R
2  0.7081  0.6356  0.5227  0.6228  0.0680  0.0681  0.0247    0.8057  0.7319  0.5816  0.6800  0.0302  0.0948  0.1018 48 
 
Table 5. Stock-Price Reactions of Exchange-Listed Firms and Rule 12h-6 Deregistering Firms Around Rule 
12h-6 Events. 
The  regression  Rp,t  =  α  +  β  ×  Rb,t  +  δ´Event_Dummy  +  εt,  is  estimated  from  Jan  1,  2005  –  Dec  31,  2007. 
Event_Dummy is a vector that includes dummy variables for deregistration event dates from www.sec.gov. In (1) 
and  (4),  Rp  is  the  daily  U.S.  dollar  return  on  a  portfolio  that  includes  all  non-U.S.  firms  cross-listed  on  U.S. 
exchanges. In (2) and (5), Rp is the return on a portfolio of firms that subsequently deregistered using Rule 12h-6 in 
2007 or 2008. In (3) and (6), Rp is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms and the portfolio 
of  exchange-listed  firms  that  did  not  deregister  (denoted “Dereg  –  Exch”).  Rb  is  the  return  on  the  benchmark 
portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 
daily observations and firms with less than $10 million in total assets are excluded. In Panel a, coefficients are 
estimated for each dummy variable. In Panel b, a single dummy variable that equals one over all event days is 
defined. Coefficients on the constant and the event dummies are multiplied by 100. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Equally-weighted portfolio returns    Value-weighted portfolio returns 



















Dereg – Exch 
 
                Constant  -0.029  -0.041  -0.012    -0.015  -0.001  0.016 
  (2.05)
**  (2.49)
**  (0.75)    (1.35)  (0.06)  (1.25) 
1    December 14, 2005  -0.053  -0.099  -0.038    -0.128  -0.078  0.058 
  (0.24)  (0.38)  (0.15)    (0.72)  (0.31)  (0.29) 
2    December 13, 2006  -0.028  0.034  0.076    0.145  0.200  0.059 
  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.29)    (0.82)  (0.80)  (0.29) 
3    March 21, 2007  0.148  0.021  -0.136    0.140  0.019  -0.141 
  (0.65)  (0.08)  (0.52)    (0.79)  (0.08)  (0.71) 
Portfolio: Level 1 & Rule 144a firms  0.868  0.881  0.014    0.870  0.870  0.001 
  (51.27)
***  (45.37)
***  (0.72)    (67.74)
***  (48.15)
***  (0.07) 
               
Number of observations  780  780  780    780  780  780 
Adjusted R
2  0.7722  0.726  -0.004    0.8555  0.7491  -0.0043 


















Dereg – Exch 
 
                Constant  -0.029  -0.041  -0.012    -0.015  -0.001  0.016 
  (2.06)
**  (2.49)
**  (0.75)    (1.35)  (0.06)  (1.26) 
All events dummy  0.022  -0.015  -0.033    0.052  0.047  -0.008 
  (0.17)  (0.10)  (0.22)    (0.51)  (0.33)  (0.07) 
Portfolio: Level 1 & Rule 144a firms  0.868  0.881  0.014    0.870  0.870  0.000 
  (51.44)
***  (45.50)
***  (0.70)    (67.88)
***  (48.25)
***  (0.03) 
               
Number of observations  780  780  780    780  780  780 
Adjusted R
2  0.7727  0.7266  -0.0019    0.8556  0.7495  -0.0026 49 
 
Table 6. Stock-Price Reactions Around Deregistration Announcements. 
This table shows the cumulative abnormal returns for firms that announced deregistration between 2002 and 2008. 
The sample includes 140 deregistering firms (67 firms prior to Rule 12h-6 and 73 firms after Rule 12h-6) with 
returns data in Datastream around the deregistration announcement. Six firms are excluded because they released 
other significant news on the same day they announced deregistration. Announcement dates are identified from 
Lexis Nexis searches, from SEC filings such as Form 6K, and for firms that deregistered under Rule 12h-6, from 
Form 15F. All returns are in U.S. dollars. Returns are adjusted with a market model. In Panel a, the benchmark 
portfolio includes all  non-U.S. firms cross-listed in the  U.S. via  Level 1 or Rule 144a ADRs. In Panel b, the 
benchmark portfolio includes all non-U.S. cross-listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. In both portfolios, 
firms are required to have at least 260 daily observations and $10 million in total assets. Market model parameters 
are estimated over the period from day -244 to -6. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed over the three 
day window (-1, +1) around the announcement date. Significance of average CARs is based on t-statistics that 
account  for  cross-sectional  dependence  as  in  Brown  and  Warner  (1985).  The  binomial  test  tests  whether  the 
percentage  of  negative  CARs  is  different  from  50%  (p-value  reported).  *,  **,  and  ***  indicate  statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. #, ##, and ### indicate that the average CAR for Rule 12h-
6 firms is significantly different from the average CAR for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6. 
           
  Panel a. Level 1 and Rule 144a 
ADRs as benchmark firms    Panel b. Non-U.S. firms on U.S. 
exchanges as benchmark firms 
  EW benchmark 
portfolio 
VW benchmark 




           
All firms           
     CAR  -1.26%  -1.18%    -1.11%  -1.18% 
     t-statistic  (2.89)
***  (2.66)
**    (2.47)
**  (2.64)
** 
     % negative  64%  64%    61%  60% 
     Binomial test (p-value)  0.001
***  0.001
***    0.006
***  0.001
*** 
           
Pre-Rule 12h-6 deregistering firms           
     CAR  -2.15%  -2.01%    -1.94%  -1.92% 
     t-statistic  (2.53)
**  (2.34)
**    (2.26)
**  (2.23)
** 
     % negative  68%  65%    62%  62% 
     Binomial test (p-value)  0.003
***  0.011
**    0.038
**  0.038
** 
           
Rule 12h-6 deregistering firms           
     CAR  -0.48%
#  -0.44%
#    -0.38%
#  -0.51% 
     t-statistic  (1.14)  (1.06)    (0.87)  (1.21) 
     % negative  61%  63%    61%  59% 
     Binomial test (p-value)  0.047
**  0.016
**    0.048
**  0.077
* 
           50 
 
Table 7. Cross-Sectional Regressions of CARs Around Deregistration Announcement Dates. 
This table presents cross-sectional regressions that examine the impact of firm and country characteristics on the 
stock-price reaction around firms deregistration announcement dates (-1,+1). Stock market reactions are estimated in 
Table 6. The sample includes 140 firms that deregistered from U.S. markets between 2002 and 2009. Six firms are 
excluded  because  they  released  other  significant  news  on  the  same  day  they  announced  deregistration.  The 
regressions include 119 firms (52 firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 and 67 firms that deregistered after 
Rule 12h-6) that have complete data on firm characteristics. Firm-level accounting data is from the Worldscope 
database. All variables are measured in the year prior to deregistration. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year 
sales growth (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), Tobin’s q is computed as ((Total Assets – Book Equity) + Market 
Value of Equity) / Total Assets (all variables are in local currency), global industry q is the median global industry 
q, the financing deficit is computed as the sum of cash dividends, investments, change in net working capital less 
internal cash flow, scaled by total assets (multiplied by 10 in the table for reporting purposes), total assets are in $ 
thousands, leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets, ROA is the return on assets, and ownership is the 
data item “closely-held shares” from Worldscope. U.S. Trading % is the percentage of the total average daily trading 
volume (home market plus U.S. market) that takes place in the U.S. SOX cost is a dummy variable that equals one 
for 28 firms that mentioned compliance costs associated with SOX as motivation for the deregistration decision in 
press releases. Legal is anti-director × rule of law, from Djankov et al. (2008) and La Porta et al. (1998). Log of 
GNP per capita ($) and stock market capitalization to GDP are from the World Bank WDI Database. t-statistics are 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Level 1 OTC/Rule 144a Firms as 
Equally-Weighted Benchmark Portfolio    Panel b. Exchange-Listed Firms as Value-
Weighted Benchmark Portfolio 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
                    Constant  -0.1839  -0.1816  -0.0354  -0.2201    -0.1938  -0.2061  -0.0526  -0.2590 
  (2.07)
**  (1.88)
*  (0.23)  (1.58)    (2.25)
**  (2.21)
**  (0.36)  (1.92)
* 
Sales growth  -0.0017  -0.0017  0.0038  -0.0505    -0.0000  0.0002  0.0011  -0.0416 
  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.18)  (1.75)
*    (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (1.48) 
Tobin’s q  0.0009  0.0009  -0.0061  0.0071    0.0030  0.0031  -0.0034  0.0081 
  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.80)  (0.85)    (0.55)  (0.57)  (0.47)  (1.00) 
Global industry q  -0.0048  -0.0050  0.0024  -0.0131    -0.0041  -0.0034  -0.0024  -0.0082 
  (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.08)  (0.63)    (0.26)  (0.21)  (0.09)  (0.41) 




***  (0.61)    (4.36)
***  (4.35)
***  (3.92)
***  (0.90) 
Log(Assets)  0.0020  0.0020  0.0008  0.0033    0.0027  0.0029  0.0018  0.0042 
  (0.94)  (0.87)  (0.20)  (1.11)    (1.27)  (1.31)  (0.52)  (1.45) 
Leverage  0.0388  0.0387  -0.0003  0.0399    0.0393  0.0400  -0.0025  0.0491 
  (1.75)
*  (1.73)
*  (0.01)  (1.29)    (1.83)
*  (1.85)
*  (0.08)  (1.64) 
ROA  0.0094  0.0091  0.028  -0.0351    -0.0034  -0.0020  -0.0065  -0.0094 
  (0.34)  (0.32)  (0.65)  (0.80)    (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.16)  (0.22) 
Ownership  -0.0013  -0.0011  -0.0040  -0.0160    -0.0003  -0.0014  -0.0043  -0.0136 
  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.55)    (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.49) 
U.S. trading %  0.0266  0.0265  -0.0317  0.0420    0.0387  0.0389  -0.0190  0.0550 
  (0.72)  (0.71)  (0.67)  (0.59)    (1.08)  (1.08)  (0.42)  (0.79) 
SOX cost dummy  -0.0033  -0.0034  -0.0123  0.0002    -0.0038  -0.0033  -0.0105  -0.0010 
  (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.62)  (0.01)    (0.42)  (0.36)  (0.55)  (0.09) 
Legal  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0017  0.0005    -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0020  0.0006 
  (0.99)  (0.93)  (2.20)
**  (0.75)    (1.06)  (1.11)  (2.72)
***  (0.94) 
Stock market cap / GDP  -0.0005  -0.0005  0.0012  -0.0001    -0.0010  -0.0005  0.0022  0.0004 
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.01)    (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.05) 
Log(GNP)  0.0152  0.0150  0.0078  0.0146    0.0149  0.0159  0.0091  0.0153 
  (1.79)
*  (1.66)
*  (0.54)  (1.11)    (1.82)
*  (1.82)
*  (0.67)  (1.20) 
Rule 12h-6 dummy    0.0007          -0.0035     
    (0.06)          (0.35)     
Number of Observations  123  123  55  68    123  123  55  68 
Adjusted R
2  0.1365  0.1285  0.3054  0.0441    0.1366  0.1296  0.3192  0.0824 51 
 
Figure 1. Deregistration Activity Over Time. 
This figure shows the number of voluntary deregistrations from 2002 through 2008 that are included in the sample. 
There are 71 firms that deregistered between 2002 and March 2007 prior to Rule 12h-6. There are 73 firms that 


















































Figure 2. The Evolution of Sales Growth and the Cross-listing Premium. 
In Panel a, the figure shows average sales growth each year from 2000 – 2007 for exchange-listed firms and for the 
sample of 73 firms that deregistered from U.S. markets using Rule 12h-6. For each sample, each year, sales growth 
is  inflation  adjusted  two-year  sales  growth  (winsorized  at  1%  and  99%  tails).  Panel  b  shows  the  estimated 
coefficients for δ3 and δ4 from the regression, qi = α + δ1 × Rule 144ai + δ2 × OTCi  + δ3 × Exchange-listedi + δ4 × 
Deregisteri + control variables, which is estimated each year from 2000 – 2007. Tobin’s q is computed as ((Total 
Assets – Book Equity) + Market Value of Equity) / Total Assets (all variables are in local currency). Exchange-
listed is a dummy variable that equals one for firms listed on a major U.S. exchange in a given year and did not 
deregister. Deregister is a dummy that equals one for the exchange-listed firms that deregistered from U.S. markets. 
The sample includes non-financial firms in the Worldscope database with total assets of at least $100 million in a 
given year. Between 2000 and 2007, the sample size for the exchange-listed firms ranges from 395 to 444; the 











































































Panel a. Evolution of sales growth







































Panel b. Evolution of the cross-listing premium
Exchange-listed firms Deregistering  firms53 
 
Appendix A. Sample of Deregistering Firms. 
This appendix provides the list of 144 non-U.S. firms that voluntarily delisted and deregistered between 2002 and 2008. There are 71 firms that deregistered prior 
to Rule 12h-6 and 73 firms that deregistered using Rule 12h-6. The sample includes firms that listed equity securities on major U.S. exchanges. Firms that 
delisted prior to Sarbanes-Oxley and firms that delisted more than two years prior to deregistration are excluded. 








Home trading market 
           
Pre-Rule 12h-6 deregistering firms           
Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc  15-12G  9/26/2006  9/26/2006  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
AT Plastics Inc  15-15D  5/30/2002  5/3/2002  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Autonomy Corp PLC  15-12G  4/29/2005  4/29/2005  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Banco Comercial Portugues SA  15-12G  10/16/2003  10/16/2003  Portugal  Euronext Lisbon 
Banco Totta & Acores SA  15-12B  11/21/2003  11/21/2003  Portugal  Euronext Lisbon 
Baran Group Ltd  15-12G  7/9/2004  6/25/2004  Israel  Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
Biacore International AB  15-12G  12/29/2004  12/29/2004  Sweden  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
Cable & Wireless PLC  15-12B  6/9/2006  9/19/2005  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Certicom Corp  15-12G  6/18/2002  6/12/2002  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Colt Telecom Group PLC  15-12G  6/19/2006  2/3/2006  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Completel Europe NV  15-12G  10/17/2003  5/27/2002  Netherlands  Euronext Paris 
Controladora Comercial Mexicana SA de CV  15-15D  12/8/2006  10/20/2006  Mexico  Mexican Stock Exchange 
Cristalerias de Chile SA (Glassworks of Chile)  15-12B  7/15/2005  4/19/2005  Chile  Santiago Stock Exchange 
Datalex PLC  15-12G  8/2/2002  4/15/2002  Ireland  Irish Stock Exchange 
Datamirror Corp  15-12G  3/1/2006  11/1/2005  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Desc SA de CV  15-12B  1/6/2005  10/20/2004  Mexico  Mexican Stock Exchange 
Dialog Semiconductor PLC  15-12G  2/7/2007  11/1/2006  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
E Machitown Co Ltd (formerly Crayfish Co)  15-12G  5/23/2005  8/22/2003  Japan  Mothers Market (Tokyo Stock Exchange) 
Eimo OYJ  15-12G  12/13/2002  12/13/2002  Finland  Helsinki Stock Exchange 
Elamex SA de CV  15-12G  1/30/2006  1/27/2006  Mexico  None 
Enodis PLC (formerly Berisford)  15-12B  8/2/2005  5/16/2005  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Espirito Santo Financial Group SA  15-15D  5/25/2006  4/28/2006  Luxembourg  Euronext Lisbon 
Esprit Energy Trust (formerly Esprit Exploration; Canadian 88 Energy)  15-12B  9/23/2002  9/20/2002  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Fisher & Paykel Healthcare Corp Ltd (formerly Fisher & Paykel Industries)  15-12G  2/28/2003  12/5/2002  New Zealand  New Zealand Stock Exchange 
Fletcher Building Ltd (formerly Fletcher Challenge Building)  15-12B  12/17/2002  12/17/2002  New Zealand  New Zealand Stock Exchange 
FNX Mining Company Inc (formerly Fort Knox Gold Resources)  15-12B  6/14/2006  5/23/2006  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Group Iusacell SA de CV  15-15D  9/14/2006  9/14/2006  Mexico  Mexican Stock Exchange 
Grupo Elektra SA de CV  15-15D  9/14/2006  9/14/2006  Mexico  Mexican Stock Exchange 
Grupo Imsa SA de CV  15-12B  6/28/2006  2/10/2005  Mexico  Mexican Stock Exchange 
Hot Cable Systems Media Ltd (formerly Matav-Cable Systems Media)  15-12G  6/30/2006  2/24/2005  Israel  Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
Group Iusacell SA de CV  15-15D  9/14/2006  9/14/2006  Mexico  Mexican Stock Exchange 
Icos Vision Systems Corp NV  15-12G  11/6/2006  10/26/2006  Belgium  Euronext Brussels 
IFCO Systems NV  15-12G  3/8/2004  3/8/2004  Netherlands  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Incam AG  15-12G  7/11/2003  7/11/2003  Germany  OTC (Berliner Freiverkehr) 54 
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Home trading market 
           
Inficon Holding AG  15-12G  9/8/2005  9/8/2005  Switzerland  SWX Swiss Exchange 
Internacional de Ceramica SA de CV  15-15D  2/2/2005  9/8/2004  Mexico  Mexican Stock Exchange 
Intershop Communications AG  15-12G  3/26/2004  10/30/2003  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
ITO-Yokado Co Ltd  15-12G  4/6/2004  4/9/2003  Japan  Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Lastminute.com PLC  15-12G  11/24/2004  7/15/2004  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Leitch Technology Corp  15-12G  6/27/2005  6/27/2005  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton  15-15D  3/8/2004  3/8/2004  France  Euronext Paris 
Metro International SA  15-12G  12/23/2003  12/11/2003  Luxembourg  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
Mintails (formerly Gaming and Entertainment Group; Trans Global 
Interactive) 
15-12G  3/3/2003  3/3/2003  Australia  Australian Stock Exchange 
Mitchells & Butlers PLC  15-12B  8/24/2006  4/13/2005  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Modern Times Group MTG AB  15-15D  12/23/2003  12/17/2003  Sweden  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
Pioneer Corp (formerly Pioneer Electronic)  15-12B  12/18/2006  12/18/2006  Japan  Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Premier Farnell PLC (formerly Farnell Electronics)  15-12B  7/1/2005  12/9/2004  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Provalis PLC (formerly Cortecs)  15-15D  12/15/2005  2/24/2005  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
QSC AG  15-12G  5/13/2003  5/13/2003  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Rank Group PLC  15-12G  4/6/2006  7/1/2005  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Regus Group PLC  15-12G  5/17/2004  11/6/2002  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Riverdeep Group PLC  15-12G  10/16/2002  10/17/2002  Ireland  Irish Stock Exchange 
Robogroup TEK Ltd (formerly Eshed Robotec 1982)  15-12G  9/8/2005  8/4/2005  Israel  Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
RSA Insurance Group PLC (formerly Royal & Sun Alliance Group)  15-15D  1/8/2007  9/28/2006  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
SAES Getters SPA  15-12G  5/8/2003  5/8/2003  Italy  Italian Stock Exchange 
Scania AB  15-15D  1/29/2003  1/29/2003  Sweden  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
Song Networks Holding AB (formerly Tele1 Europe Holding)  15-12G  6/30/2003  6/30/2003  Sweden  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
SYGNIS Pharma AG (formerly Lion Bioscience)  15-12G  5/19/2005  8/5/2004  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Tatneft OAO  15-12B  12/15/2006  6/27/2006  Russia  London Stock Exchange 
Tele2 AB (formerly Netcom AB)  15-12G  6/29/2006  6/30/2006  Sweden  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
Telent PLC (formerly Marconi Corp)  15-12G  9/14/2006  10/25/2005  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Tenon Ltd (formerly Fletcher Challenge Forests)  15-12G  6/9/2005  6/10/2005  New Zealand  New Zealand Stock Exchange 
Toll NZ Ltd (formerly Tranz Rail Holdings)  15-12G  10/28/2002  10/25/2002  New Zealand  Australian Stock Exchange 
Trader Classified Media NV (formerly Trader.com)  15-12G  12/19/2002  12/18/2002  Netherlands  Euronext Paris 
Tradus (formerly QXL Ricardo PLC)  15-12G  3/31/2003  2/26/2003  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Transcom Worldwide SA  15-12G  5/28/2003  5/14/2003  Luxembourg  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
Transgene SA  15-15D  4/3/2006  10/12/2005  France  Euronext Paris 
TV Azteca SA de CV  15-15D  9/14/2006  9/14/2006  Mexico  Mexican Stock Exchange 
United Business Media PLC (formerly United News and Media)  15-12G  2/2/2006  12/22/2004  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Vero Software PLC (formerly VI Group)  15-12G  5/12/2004  5/12/2004  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Vivendi SA (formerly Vivendi Universal)  15-12B  10/31/2006  1/17/2006  France  Euronext Paris 
Wescast Industries Inc  15-12G  7/1/2005  6/16/2005  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 55 
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Home trading market 
           
Rule 12h-6 deregistering firms           
Acambis PLC (formerly Peptide Therapeutics)  15F-12G  6/7/2007  9/13/2006  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Air France-KLM  15F-12B  2/7/2008  11/22/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
Akzo Nobel NV  15F-12G  9/28/2007  7/24/2007  Netherlands  Euronext Amsterdam 
Altana  15F-12G  6/21/2007  4/26/2007  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Amcor Ltd  15F-12G  6/4/2007  5/2/2007  Australia  Australian Stock Exchange 
Ansell Ltd  15F-12G  6/5/2007  5/4/2006  Australia  Australian Stock Exchange 
Arcadis NV (formerly Heidemij NV)  15F-12G  6/9/2008  5/16/2007  Netherlands  Euronext Amsterdam 
Atlas South Sea Pearl LTD (formerly Atlas Pacific)  15F-12G  6/30/2008  7/11/2007  Australia  Australian Stock Exchange 
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd  15F-12G  7/13/2007  6/20/2007  Australia  Australian Stock Exchange 
BASF AG  15F-12B  9/6/2007  7/30/2007  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Bayer AG  15F-12B  9/28/2007  9/5/2007  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Benetton Group SPA  15F-12B  10/22/2007  9/12/2007  Italy  Italian Stock Exchange 
BG Group PLC  15F-12B  9/21/2007  7/25/2007  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
British Airways PLC  15F-12B  6/5/2007  4/25/2007  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Bunzl PLC  15F-12B  6/6/2007  5/1/2007  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Canwest Global Communications Corp  15F-12B  6/13/2007  5/11/2007  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Dassault Systemes SA  15F-12G  10/16/2008  7/31/2008  France  Euronext Paris 
Dorel Industries Inc  15F-12G  4/1/2008  4/1/2008  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Ducati Motor Holding SPA  15F-12B  6/4/2007  5/14/2007  Italy  Italian Stock Exchange 
E On AG  15F-12B  9/10/2007  8/21/2007  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
EDP Energias De Portugal SA  15F-12B  6/7/2007  5/18/2007  Portugal  Euronext Lisbon 
Enel SPA  15F-12B  12/20/2007  11/29/2007  Italy  Italian Stock Exchange 
EPCOS AG  15F-15D  11/30/2007  11/8/2007  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Extendicare REIT (formerly Extendicare Inc)  15F-12B  6/4/2007  6/4/2007  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Fiat SPA  15F-12B  8/3/2007  8/3/2007  Italy  Italian Stock Exchange 
Genesys SA  15F-12B  6/4/2007  5/10/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
Groupe Danone  15F-12B  7/5/2007  4/26/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
Hanaro Telecom Inc  15F-12B  6/28/2007  2/22/2006  Korea  Korea Securities Dealers (KOSDAQ) 
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC  15F-12B  9/12/2008  7/24/2008  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Infovista SA  15F-12G  6/25/2007  6/25/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
International Power PLC (formerly National Power)  15F-12B  6/28/2007  6/6/2007  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Koor Industries Ltd  15F-12B  2/11/2008  5/14/2007  Israel  Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
KPN NV (Royal KPN)  15F-12B  4/4/2008  12/17/2007  Netherlands  Euronext Amsterdam 
Lafarge  15F-12B  9/24/2007  8/2/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
LMS Medical Systems Inc  15F-12B  6/6/2008  6/4/2008  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Macronix International Ltd  15F-12G  10/29/2007  9/21/2007  Taiwan  Taiwan Stock Exchange 56 
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MASISA SA (formerly Terranova)  15F-12B  3/13/2008  2/20/2008  Chile  Santiago Stock Exchange 
Meldex International PLC (formerly Bioprogress)  15F-12G  6/18/2007  5/29/2007  U.K.  AIM (London Stock Exchange) 
Metso Corp (formerlyValmet-Rauma)  15F-12B  9/17/2007  7/26/2007  Finland  OMX Nordic Exchange 
Millea Holdings Inc (formerly (Tokyo Marine and Fire)  15F-12G  7/30/2007  7/5/2007  Japan  Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Mirae Corporation  15F-12G  5/20/2008  3/7/2008  Korea  Korea Exchange (KRX) 
Naspers Ltd  15F-15D  6/8/2007  5/17/2007  South Africa  Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
National Australia Bank Ltd  15F-12B  6/21/2007  5/10/2007  Australia  Australian Stock Exchange 
National Telephone Co of Venezuela (CANTV)  15F-12B  6/30/2008  5/17/2007  Venezuela  Caracas Stock Exchange 
NIS Group (formerly Nissin Company)  15F-12G  8/8/2008  7/14/2008  Japan  Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Norsk Hydro ASA  15F-12B  11/29/2007  10/22/2007  Norway  Oslo Stock Exchange 
Oce NV (formerly Oce Van Der Grinten)  15F-12G  6/29/2007  6/29/2007  Netherlands  Euronext Amsterdam 
PCCW Ltd (formerly Pacific Century Cyberworks)  15F-12B  6/4/2007  4/27/2007  Hong Kong  Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Petroleum Geo Services  15F-12B  7/20/2007  6/26/2007  Norway  Oslo Stock Exchange 
Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology AG  15F-12B  10/4/2007  8/30/2007  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Publicis Groupe SA  15F-12B  9/7/2007  9/7/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
Rhodia  15F-12B  9/28/2007  7/31/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
Royal Ahold NV  15F-12B  9/28/2007  8/29/2007  Netherlands  Euronext Amsterdam 
SCOR  15F-12B  6/4/2007  4/3/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
SGL Carbon AG  15F-12B  6/26/2008  3/26/2007  Germany  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Skyepharma PLC  15F-12G  6/4/2007  5/3/2007  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Sodexho Alliance SA  15F-12B  7/16/2007  5/30/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
Spirent Communications PLC  15F-12B  6/5/2007  3/1/2007  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Stolt Nielsen SA  15F-12G  5/28/2008  5/28/2008  U.K.  Oslo Stock Exchange 
Stora Enso Corp  15F-12B  1/7/2008  12/6/2007  Finland  OMX Nordic Exchange 
Suez (formerly Suez Lyonnaise Des Eaux)  15F-12B  9/21/2007  8/29/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
Technip  15F-12B  8/6/2007  7/25/2007  France  Euronext Paris 
Telekom Austria AG  15F-12B  6/5/2007  4/24/2007  Austria  Vienna Stock Exchange 
Telenor ASA  15F-12G  6/12/2007  5/22/2007  Norway  Oslo Stock Exchange 
Telstra Corp Ltd  15F-12B  6/4/2007  3/28/2007  Netherlands  Euronext Amsterdam 
TNT NV (formerly TPG NV)  15F-12B  6/18/2007  5/29/2007  Netherlands  Euronext Amsterdam 
Trend Micro Inc  15F-12G  6/27/2007  4/26/2007  Japan  Tokyo Stock Exchange 
United Utilities PLC  15F-12B  6/25/2007  5/30/2007  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
UPM Kymmene Corp  15F-12B  12/6/2007  10/30/2007  Finland  OMX Nordic Exchange 
Vernalis PLC (formerly British Biotech)  15F-12G  6/4/2007  4/24/2007  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 
Volvo AB  15F-12G  12/13/2007  6/14/2007  Sweden  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
Westaim Corp  15F-12G  10/21/2008  10/20/2008  Canada  Toronto Stock Exchange 
Wolseley PLC  15F-12B  1/2/2008  12/11/2007  U.K.  London Stock Exchange 57 
 
Appendix B. Firms Excluded From the Final Sample. 
This appendix provides the list of 163 non-U.S. firms that deregistered with the SEC. We exclude 35 firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 and 128 firms 
that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. 
Excluded firms  Reason for exclusion 
   
Pre-Rule 12h-6 period   
Baltimore PLC (formerly Baltimore Technologies)  Deregistered after SOX, but delisted prior to SOX; deregistered more than two years after delisting 
Cinram Income Fund (formerly Cinram International)  Deregistered after SOX, but delisted prior to SOX; deregistered more than two years after delisting 
Quebecor Inc  Deregistered after SOX, but delisted prior to SOX; deregistered more than two years after delisting 
Hilan Tech Ltd (formerly Teleweb Telegraph Comm)  Deregistered after SOX, but delisted prior to SOX; deregistered more than two years after delisting; not in Worldscope 
SKF Inc  Delisted in 2003, but deregistered under Rule 12h-6 
Swedish Match Corp  Delisted in 2004, but deregistered under Rule 12h-6 
Telefonica Del Peru SAA  Delisted in 2004, but deregistered under Rule 12h-6 
Teliasonera AB  Delisted in 2004, but deregistered under Rule 12h-6 
Electrolux AB  Delisted in 2005, but deregistered under Rule 12h-6 
Nera ASA  Deregistered more than two years after delisting 
Virgin Express Holdings PLC  Deregistered more than two years after delisting 
Carmel Container Systems  Not in Worldscope 
Aegis Group PLC  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Docdata NV  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Ecsoft Group PLC  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
EPI Holdings (formerly Great Wall Cybertech / Electronic)  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Grupo Movil Access SA de CV (formerly BIPER)  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Israel Land Development Company Ltd  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Mid-States PLC  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Premium Brands Inc (formerly Fletcher Fine Foods)  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Sky Network Television Ltd  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget (SCA)  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Virgin Group PLC  Voluntarily delisted and deregistered prior to SOX 
Norcen Energy Resources Ltd  Voluntarily delisted in 1994; acquired by Union Pacific Resources Inc in 1998 and subsequently deregistered the securities 
English China Clays PLC (formerly ECC Group)  Voluntarily delisted in 1997; press release states it applied to the SEC to deregister its ordinary shares; we cannot find a Form 15 on Edgar 
or Thomson Research to verify deregistration; acquired by Imetal (now Imerys) in 1999 
Nord Pacific Ltd  Voluntarily delisted in 1998; acquired by Allied Gold in 2004 and subsequently deregistered the securities 
Rigel Energy Corp (formerly Total Canada Oil & Gas)  Voluntarily delisted in 1998; acquired by Talisman in 1999 and subsequently deregistered the securities 
Ramco Energy PLC  Voluntarily delisted in 2000 and does not file anymore; we cannot find a Form 15 on Edgar or Thomson Research to verify deregistration 
Russel Metals Inc (formerly Federal Industries)  Voluntarily delisted in 2000 and said it would deregister 90 days later, but we cannot find a Form 15 on Edgar or on Thomson Research to 
verify deregistration; continued filing with the SEC in connection with U.S. registered senior notes until it deregistered them in 2007 
Interactive Investor International PLC (formerly III)  Voluntarily delisted in 2001; was acquired by AMP later in 2001 and subsequently deregistered the securities 58 
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Excluded firms  Reason for exclusion 
   
Electrochemical Industries (1952) Ltd (formerly 
Electrochem Industries Frutarom) 
Voluntarily delisted in 2002; we cannot find a Form 15 on Edgar or on Thomson Research to verify deregistration; in 2004, three Israeli 
banks filed for Electrochemical Industries to be placed in receivership 
Liquidation World Inc  Voluntarily delisted in 2003 and does not file anymore; we cannot find a Form 15 on Edgar or Thomson Research to verify deregistration 
Boadwalk Real REIT (formerly Boardwalk Equities)  Voluntarily delisted in 2004 and does not file anymore; we cannot find a Form 15 on Edgar or Thomson Research to verify deregistration 
CSK Corp (formerly CSK Holdings)  Voluntarily delisted in 2005 and does not file anymore; we cannot find a Form 15 on Edgar or Thomson Research to verify deregistration 
Kirin Brewery Company Ltd  Voluntarily delisted in 2006 and does not file anymore; we cannot find a Form 15 on Edgar or Thomson Research to verify deregistration 
   
Rule 12h-6 period   
ASE Test Ltd  Acquired by ASE Inc and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Arizona Star Resource Corp  Acquired by Barrick Gold and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Bayer Schering Pharma AG  Acquired by Bayer and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Xenova Group PLC  Acquired by Celtic Pharma Development and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
QUILMES Industrial SA  Acquired by Companhia de Bebidas das Americas (AmBev) (now Anheuser-Busch InBev) and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Northern Peru Copper Corp  Acquired by Copper Bridge Acquisition Corp and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Hawthorne Gold Corp  Acquired by Cusac Gold Mines Ltd and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Inco Ltd  Acquired by CVRD and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Pacific Asia China Energy Inc  Acquired by GREKA China Ltd and GREKA Acquisitions Ltd and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Hanson Building Materials PLC (formerly Hanson)  Acquired by HeidelbergCement AG and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Novatel Inc  Acquired by Hexagon Canada Acquisition Inc and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Scottish Power PLC  Acquired by Iberdrola and deregistered as a result of the takeover; also deregistered debt securities 
Tyler Resources Inc  Acquired by Jinchuan Group and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Merck Serono SA  Acquired by Merck KGaA and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
TDC A/S  Acquired by Nordic Telephone Company and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
CDG Investments Inc  Acquired by Preo Software and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Fortel Inc  Acquired by QuStream and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Action Energy Inc  Acquired by Rolling Thunder and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
SCOR Holding Ltd (formerly Converium Holding)  Acquired by SCOR and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Corporate Express NV  Acquired by Staples and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
ECI Telecom Ltd  Acquired by Swarth Group and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Novamerican Steel Inc  Acquired by Symmetry Holdings Inc and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Embratel Participacoes SA  Acquired by Telefonos de Mexico and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Protherics PLC  Acquired by Therapeutic Antibodies Inc and deregistered as a result of the takeover 
Breakwater Resources Ltd  Delisted by Nasdaq for violating listing standards; moved to the OTC market and subsequently deregistered 
SR Telecom Inc  Delisted by Nasdaq for violating listing standards; moved to the OTC market and subsequently deregistered 
Petsec Energy Ltd  Delisted by the NYSE for violating listing standards; moved to the OTC market and subsequently deregistered 
Unimarc Supermarkets Inc  Delisted by the NYSE for violating listing standards; moved to the OTC market and subsequently deregistered 59 
 
Appendix B, continued. 
Excluded firms  Reason for exclusion 
   
Alstom  Delisted by the NYSE for violating listing standards; previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities 
British Energy Group PLC  Delisted by the NYSE for violating listing standards; previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities 
Electrolux AB  Deregistered under Rule 12h-6, but delisted prior to Rule 12h-6 period; delisted more than two years before deregistration 
SKF Inc  Deregistered under Rule 12h-6, but delisted prior to Rule 12h-6 period; delisted more than two years before deregistration 
Swedish Match Corp  Deregistered under Rule 12h-6, but delisted prior to Rule 12h-6 period; delisted more than two years before deregistration 
Telefonica Del Peru SAA  Deregistered under Rule 12h-6, but delisted prior to Rule 12h-6 period; delisted more than two years before deregistration 
Teliasonera AB  Deregistered under Rule 12h-6, but delisted prior to Rule 12h-6 period; delisted more than two years before deregistration 
Aerco Ltd  Deregistering debt securities only 
AES Gener Inc  Deregistering debt securities only 
Ainsworth Lumber Co Ltd  Deregistering debt securities only 
Aurelia Energy NV  Deregistering debt securities only 
BELL Canada  Deregistering debt securities only 
Camboriu Cable System de Telecomunicacoes Ltd  Deregistering debt securities only 
Cemex, SAB de CV  Deregistering debt securities only 
Commercial Cable TV Sao Paulo Ltd  Deregistering debt securities only 
Concordia Bus AB  Deregistering debt securities only 
Concordia Bus Finland OY AB  Deregistering debt securities only 
Concordia Bus Nordic AB  Deregistering debt securities only 
Concordia Bus Nordic Holding AB  Deregistering debt securities only 
Gracechurch Card Funding No 6 PLC  Deregistering debt securities only 
Hanson Australia Funding Ltd  Deregistering debt securities only 
Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc  Deregistering debt securities only 
Kowloon Canton Railway Corp  Deregistering debt securities only 
MTR Corp LTD  Deregistering debt securities only 
Norbord Inc  Deregistering debt securities only 
OSLO Challenger PLC  Deregistering debt securities only 
OSLO Explorer PLC  Deregistering debt securities only 
OSLO Seismic Services Inc  Deregistering debt securities only 
PGS Geophysical AS  Deregistering debt securities only 
Russel Metals Inc  Deregistering debt securities only 
Smurfit Kappa Funding PLC  Deregistering debt securities only 
Tevecap SA  Deregistering debt securities only 
TVA Communications Ltd  Deregistering debt securities only 
TVA Parana Ltd  Deregistering debt securities only 
Shaw Communications Inc  Deregistration of preferred shares only; common shares are still listed on the NYSE 
Third Century Bancorp  Filing under Rule 12g-4(a), a pre-existing rule; the rule change has no bearing on the decision to deregister 
ACE Aviation Holdings Inc.  Holding from Air Canada court-supervised restructuring; was terminated and distributed its assets to shareholders 60 
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Excluded firms  Reason for exclusion 
   
Intesa Sanpaolo SPA  Merger between Intesa and Sanpaolo IMI; Sanpaolo IMI's securities were deregistered as a result of the merger 
East Energy Corp (fomerly Gobi Gold)  Never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Gemalto NV  Never listed on a U.S. exchange; successor registrant after acquiring Gemplus (registered); subsequently deregistered 
Coolbrands International Inc  Never listed on a U.S. exchange; successor registrant after acquiring Integrated Brands (registered); subsequently deregistered 
Genterra Inc  Never listed on a U.S. exchange; successor registrant after acquiring Mirtronics (registered); subsequently deregistered 
BTG PLC  Never listed on a U.S. exchange; successor registrant after acquiring Protherics; subsequently deregistered 
Iberdrola SA  Never listed on a U.S. exchange; successor registrant after acquiring Scottish Power; subsequently deregistered  
Vecima Networks Inc  Never listed on a U.S. exchange; successor registrant after acquiring Spectrum Signal Processing (registered); subsequently deregistered 
Sopheon PLC (formerly Polydoc)  Never listed on a U.S. exchange;  successor registrant after  acquired Teltech (registered); subsequently deregistered 
Telecom Italia Media SPA  Never listed on a U.S. exchange; acquired Tin.it (owned by Telecom Italia) and offered ordinary shares to Telecom Italia's shareholders in 
the US; subsequently deregistered the securities 
Arcelor Brasil (formerly Belgo-Mineira Steel)  Never listed on a U.S. exchange; merger between Belgo-Mineira, Companhia Siderurgica de Tubarao, and Vega do Sul 
Daiichi Sankyo Company Ltd  Never listed on a U.S. exchange; merger between Daiichi Pharmaceutical and Sankyo Company 
ETZ Lavud Ltd  No data in Worldscope 
Eurotrust A/S  No data in Worldscope or Datastream 
Advanced Proteome Therapeutics Corp  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Alamos Gold Inc  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Atlanta Gold Inc (formerly Twin Mining)  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Berkley Resources Inc  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Candente Resource Corp  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
CLP Holdings Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Commonwealth Bank Of Australia  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Crew Gold Corp  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
El Nino Ventures Inc  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Euro Disney SCA  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Evolving Gold Corp  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Farallon Resources Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Gentry Resources Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Guildhall Minerals Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Halo Resources Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
J Pacific GoldInc  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Kirkland Lake Gold Inc  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Lund Gold Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
OSI Geospatial Inc (formerly Offshore Systems Int’l)  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
PivX Solutions Inc  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Resin Systems Inc  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Rolling Thunder Exploration Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 61 
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Sonic Technology Solutions Inc  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Southwestern Resources Corp  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Vannessa Ventures Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Wealth Minerals Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Zoloto Resources Ltd  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange 
Cookson Group PLC  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange; previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities 
Pernod Ricard SA  OTC listed, but never listed on a U.S. exchange; previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities 
Autonomy Corp PLC  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Cable & Wireless PLC  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Cinram International Income Fund (formerly Cinram Int’l)  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities 
Colt Telecom Group PLC  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Dialog Semiconductor PLC  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Enodis PLC (formerly Berisford)  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Fletcher Building Ltd (formerly Fletcher Challenge)  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
ICOS Vision Systems Corp NV  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Mitchells & Butlers PLC  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
OAO Tatneft  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Premier Farnell PLC (formerly Farnell Electronics)  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Rank Group PLC  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
RSA Insurance Group PLC (formerly Royal & Sun)  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Tenon Ltd (formerly Fletcher Challenge Forests)  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
United Business Media PLC  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Vivendi SA (formerly Vivendi Universal)  Previously filed form 15 and deregistered the subject securities (included in Pre-Rule 12h-6 sample) 
Imperial Chemical Industries PLC  Received and rejected a takeover bid just prior to Form 15F filing; subsequently acquired by Akzo Nobel NV 
Havas SA  Received notice of non-compliance with listing standards from Nasdaq and then announced voluntary delisting; previously filed Form 15 
Coles Group Ltd (formerly Coles Myer)  Voluntarily delisted from the NYSE in 2006; became an acquisition target prior to deregistration; subsequently acquired by Wesfarmers 
 
 